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THE RIGHT TO REQUIRE PERFORMANCE IN
INTERNATIONAL SALES: TOWARDS AN
INTERNATIONAL INTERPRETATION OF
THE VIENNA CONVENTION
Amy H. Kastely*
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods1 ("Sales Convention" or "Convention") is now law.2
The Convention was drafted by the United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), a representative body with
delegates from thirty-six states, representing all of the regions of the
world.3 UNCITRAL began its work on a Sales Convention in 1968.
* Associate Professor of Law, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii. I
thank Joyce McCarty for many acts of friendship in the preparation of this article.
1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.97/18, Annex I (1980) [hereinafter Sales Convention or Convention], reprinted in
UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS,
OFFICIAL RECORDS

at 178, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, U.N. Sales No. E.8l.IV.3 (1981), and in
19 I.L.M. 671 (1980).
Many of the legislative materials cited in this article are reprinted in UNITED NATIONS

CONFERENCE ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, OFFICIAL RECORDS,

U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/19, U.N. Sales No. E.81.IV.3 (1981) [hereinafter OFFICIAL RECORDS].
Unless otherwise noted, all page references for materials reprinted in the OFFICIAL RECORDS are
to the reprinted version, not the original.
2. The Convention entered into force on the first day of the month following the expiration of
twelve months after the date of deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification. Sales Convention,
supra note 1, art. 99. On December 11, 1986, China, Italy, and the United States deposited
instruments of ratification, bringing the number of ratifications to eleven. U.N. Dept. of Public
Information, Press Release No. L/T/3849 (Dec. 11, 1986) [hereinafter Press Release]. The
Convention therefore came into force as law on January 1, 1988. The first eight nations to ratify
or accede were Argentina, Egypt, France, Hungary, Lesotho, Syria, Yugoslavia, and Zambia.
Status of Conventions:Note by the Secretariatat 4, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/271 (1985). As of June
14, 1988, Australia, Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Mexico had added their assent, bringing to
sixteen the number of nations having filed instruments of ratification or accession. Telephone
interview with staff member, United Nations Treaty Office (June 14, 1988). To determine
whether a nation has ratified or acceded to the Convention, contact the U.N. Treaty Office by
telephone-(212) 963-3918.
Article 1(I) defines the scope of the Convention's coverage: "This Convention applies to
contracts of sale of goods between parties whose places of business are in different States: (a)
when the States are Contracting States; or (b) when the rules of private international law lead to
the application of the law of a Contracting State." Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
A Contracting State may declare that it will not be bound by article 1(b). Sales Convention,
supra note 1, art. 95. The United States has made such a declaration. Status of the Conventions:
Note by the Secretariatat 5, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/294 (1987).
3. The membership was originally set at 29 and was enlarged to 36 in 1973. A formula in the
Commission's charter specifies the following allocation of delegates: Africa, nine; Asia, seven;
Eastern Europe, five; Latin America, six; Western Europe and Others (including Australia,
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The full Commission met once a year for two to four weeks until a
draft of the Convention was approved by the Commission in 1978.' A
diplomatic conference of sixty-two states5 meeting in Vienna in 1980
reviewed this draft, made a number of changes, and gave unanimous
approval to the Sales Convention. 6 The United States ratified the Convention on December 11, 1986, 7 and the Convention came into force
January 1, 1988.8
As law, the Sales Convention is unusual in the relative purity of its
origins.9 Throughout the drafting process, the UNCITRAL delegates
struggled to overcome the conceptual barriers of their various national
legal backgrounds and to discover common solutions to typical
problems. Professor John Honnold, who served as Chief of the United
Nations International Trade Law Branch ("Secretariat") and Secretary to the Commission,10 has described this method of drafting:
Canada and the United States), nine. G.A. Res. 2205 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR (1497th plen.
mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/6396 (1966), reprintedin [1968-70] 1 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE
L. 65, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970; G.A. Res. 3108 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR (2197th
plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/9408 (1973), reprintedin [1974] 5 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE
L. 11, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1974. See generally Honnold, The United Nations
Commission on InternationalTrade Law: Mission and Methods, 27 AM. J. CoMp. L. 201 (1979).
4. See Report of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law on the Work of
Its Eleventh Session, 33 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17), U.N. Doc. A/33/17 (1978), reprinted in
[1978] 9 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L. 14, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1978.
Much of the actual drafting was done by the Working Group on the International Sale of
Goods, established after an initial review of the 1964 Uniform Laws on the International Sale of
Goods and the Formation of Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. See J. HONNOLD,
UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
§ 9, at 53-54 (1982). The Working Group originally included representatives from Brazil,
France, Ghana, Hungary, India, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Norway, Tunisia, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Later the membership
was expanded to include members from Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Philippines, and Sierra
Leone. The Working Group was chaired by Professor Jorge Barrera Graf of Mexico. Id.
5. A list of the 62 participating nations is included in Final Act of the United Nations
Conference on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/18 (1980),
[hereinafter Final Act] reprinted in OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 176. Several
organizations also participated in the 1980 Vienna Conference, including the Bank for
International Settlements, Central Office for International Railway Transport, Council of
Europe, European Economic Community, Hague Conference on Private International Law,
International Chamber of Commerce, International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT), and the World Bank. Id.
6. FinalAct, supra note 5, at 176. The Convention was approved in six official languages:
Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, and Spanish. Id.
7. See Press Release, supra note 2.
8. See supra note 2.
9. As one quip goes: Law, like sausage, is best enjoyed in ignorance of what goes into its
creation.
10. J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 8, at 52.
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The Secretariat studies and proposals laid before the legislative body
did not lead off in difficult areas with proposed legislative drafts. Instead,
the delegates were confronted with what the puzzled civil law delegates
called the "common-law case method"--concrete hypothetical cases
calling for decisions as to result rather than legislative words....

What came next was, for me, even more significant: the relative ease
with which delegates, from different backgrounds, reached agreement
on results. Some will say this shows that there is a universal natural
law-others, that there are basic principles of commercial and legal efficiency, just as survival in the sea (beyond the reef) . . . molded the
dolphin and the shark into almost identical lines although they entered
the sea from wildly different backgrounds.
To return to dry land: After agreement was reached on what results
should flow from a series of factual cases, it was not too difficult to agree
on words to express the result."

When dealing with difficult topics, the UNCITRAL delegates began
their discussions with factual situations .and sought consensus on the
proper outcome in each case. They then articulated the results in
words that they hoped would be free from the baggage of any one
particular legal system. By using words that refer to events in the
world, they sought to escape the limits of any one conceptual
scheme. 12

This method certainly focused the delegates' attention on specific
issues raised by each provision, and it also must have provided the
group with a context for discussion that avoided the hopelessly irreconcilable conceptual differences among the legal cultures represented
in the Commission.13 The success of this method can be seen espe11. J. Honnold, Beyond the Reef- Uniform LawforInternationalTrade, Remarks made at the
William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii 7-8 (May 13, 1986) (available at the
William S. Richardson Law School Library and Washington Law Review offices) [hereinafter
Beyond the Reef]; see also J. HoNNOLD, supra note 4, § 33, at 69 ("One device used by the
Secretariat in presenting issues to UNCITRAL seemed to facilitate agreement and, perhaps, a
more direct mode of expression. At points where proposed legal texts might be read differently
by delegates from different legal backgrounds, the crucial issues were posed initially in terms of
concrete factual examples."). For examples of such factual hypotheticals, see Working Paper
Preparedby the Secretariatparas. 71, 74, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.1 (1970), reprintedin
[1968-70] 1 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L. 197, U.N. Doe. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970.
12. J. Honnold, Beyond the Reef supra note 11, at 4 ("What one needs to do is to cut out
legal idioms, and write the rules in terms of commercial events that happen around the world.
Without knowing the languages of the world you can be sure that there have to be words for these
commercial events wherever there is commerce."); see, e.g., Sales Convention, supra note 1, art.
67 (defining passage of risk of loss as "when the goods are handed over to the first carrier"); see
also J. HoNNOLD, supra note 4, §§ 32-33, at 67-69.
13. For a witty and insightful view of this process, see Edrsi, Unifying the Law (A Play in One
Act, With a Song), 25 AM. J. CoMP. L. 658 (1977); Ebrsi, A Propos the 1980 Vienna Convention
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cially in provisions on risk of loss, 14 force majeure,"5 and the like 16
that traditionally have been major conceptual battlegrounds between
civil and common law systems. 17
On some points, however, the delegates did not agree. This was true
of the Convention's remedial provisions, which reflect an awkward
compromise between two distinct approaches to contract damages. 8
Briefly, most civil law and socialist legal systems conclude that each
party to a contract is entitled to performance from the other side.19
The remedial schemes that flow from this principle generally emphasize an aggrieved party's right to compel performance by the breaching party. For largely historical reasons, 20 most common law systems
on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 31 AM. J. COMP. L. 333 (1983) [hereinafter A
Propos the Convention].
14. Sales Convention, supra note 1, arts. 66-70.
15. Id. art. 79.
16. See, e.g., id. arts. 50 (buyer's right to reduce the price), 58 (time for payment).
17. See Edrsi, A Propos the Convention, supra note 13.
18. See Date-Bah, The United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of
Goods, 1980: Overview and Selective Commentary, 11 REv. GHANA L. 50, 62 (1979); Edrsi, A
Propos the Convention, supra note 13, at 347; Farnsworth, Damages and Specific Relief 27
AMER. J. COMP. L. 247, 249 (1979); Gonzalez, Remedies Under the U.N. Convention for the
InternationalSale of Goods, 2 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 79, 97 (1984); Ziegel, The Remedial
Provisions in the Vienna Sales Convention: Some Common Law Perspectives,in INTERNATIONAL
SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE

OF GOODS 9-1, 9-10 to 9-11 (1984).
19. See generally I. SzAsz, THE CMEA UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 167 (2d

ed. 1985); Dawson, Specific Performancein Franceand Germany, 57 MICH. L. REV. 495 (1959);
E6rsi, Contract in the Socialist Economy: General Survey, in VII-5 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 3 (1981); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of

Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1150-51 (1970); Szladits, The Concept of Specific
Performancein Civil Law, 4 AM. J. COMP. L. 208, 233 (1955); Treitel, Specific Performancein the
Sale of Goods, 1966 J. Bus. L. 211; Comment, The Convention on Contractsfor the International
Sale of Goods and the General Conditionsfor the Sale of Goods, 12 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 451,
457 (1982).
20. In brief, although early common law courts granted various remedies that operated much
like specific relief, the remedy of specific performance became identified with the courts of
chancery, which had only a limited impact on contract litigation because of a variety of
jurisdictional, political, and ideological factors. See Berryman, The Specific Performance
Damages Continuum: An Historical Perspective, 17 OTTAWA L. REV. 295, 296-306 (1985);
Farnsworth, supra note 19, at 1152-56. Legal formalists advocated rejection of the discretionary
doctrines of equity and the remedy of specific performance at the end of the nineteenth and
beginning of the twentieth centuries. Berryman, supra, at 305-06. Loosely associated with the
formalist critique was a notion that orders of specific performance wrongfully infringe the liberty
of the promisor. Cf Farnsworth, supra note 19, at 1152-53, 1156 (emphasizing the coercive
aspects of specific performance as an important reason for its limited use). But cf Schwartz, The
Case for Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 296-98 (1979) (arguing that concerns with
liberty are significant only where the contract involves personal services or goods to which the
promisor has sentimental attachments and noting that the liberty interests involved in the second
case are not now recognized by the law and have not yet been shown to be substantial enough to
warrant exception to a rule favoring specific performance).

Requiring Performance in International Sales
conclude that, although entitled to the monetary equivalent of performance, an aggrieved party normally may not compel actual performance by the breaching party.2 1 Although each system recognizes
various mitigating rules that lead to similar results in many cases,22
still the differences between them can be crucial in some

circumstances.
A relatively common case, for example, is where a contract provides
for specially manufactured goods and the manufacturer repudiates
before delivery. Under any legal system, if satisfactory substitute
goods are available from another manufacturer, the best course for the
aggrieved buyer will be to purchase the substitute goods, regardless of
any right to compel performance by the breaching party. Sometimes,
however, the purchase of substitute goods will not be a satisfactory
solution. Substitute goods may be difficult to locate; their production
may entail some delay; their price may be substantially above the contract price; or alternative manufacturers may not have comparable
reputations for quality.2 3 Similarly, a buyer may doubt that a damage
award will be adequate or enforceable. In any of these cases, a buyer

may well prefer to insist that the original manufacturer supply the
goods, even if that requires some litigation. In such a case, most civil

law and socialist systems would require the original manufacturer to
perform, while many common law courts would not.2 4
21. See generally E.A. FARNSWORTH, CoNTRACTs 818-23 (1982).
22. See Treitel, Remedies for Breach of Contract,in VII-16 INTERNATIONAL

ENCYCLOPEDIA

(1976).
23. See, eg., Duval & Co. v. Malcom, 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975) (substantial
increase in market price of cotton); Scholl v. Hartzell, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 304, 33 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. 951, 954 (Callaghan) (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1981) (1962 Chevrolet Corvette, rare but not "unique").
OF COMPARATIVE LAW

24. See generally Treitel, supra note 22, at 16-7 to 16-39. It is difficult to generalize how
common law courts approach cases of this kind because the doctrine affords so much discretion
to the trial court. Compare, eg., Scholl v. Hartzell, 20 Pa. D. & C.3d 304, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
951, 954 (Callaghan) (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1981) (no specific performance of contract for sale of 1962
Corvette) with Sedmak v. Charlie's Chevrolet, Inc., 622 S.W.2d 694 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981)
(granting specific performance of contract for the sale of a Corvette). In addition, the liberal
attitude toward specific performance embodied in section 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial
Code has led some courts to grant specific performance in circumstances like those described in
the text. See, eg., Laclede Gas Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975) (specific
performance available where costs of arranging substitute purchases are uncertain); Copylease
Corp. of Am. v. Memorex Corp., 408 F. Supp. 758 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (specific performance should
be available where alternative brands of toner were inferior in quality). In view of these cases,
one wonders whether the UNCITRAL members representing the common law nations actually
overestimated the degree to which common law courts refuse specific performance. Cf Ziegel,
supra note 18, at 9-10 ("In any event, the common law is less than consistent in its own position
....
[Tihere is evidence that the remedy is gaining ground among judges in the sales as well as
non-sales areas.").
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The Sales Convention does not finally resolve this conflict. Its principal remedial provisions establish a clear right to performance similar
to that recognized in most civil law and socialist systems. Article 46
provides that "[t]he buyer may require performance by the seller of
[his] obligations." 2 5 Similarly, article 62 provides that "[t]he seller
may require the buyer to pay the price, take delivery or perform his
other obligations. '2 6 Article 28, however, located in a different part of
the Convention, provides that even if one party is entitled to performance, "a court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own law in respect of
27
similar contracts of sale not governed by this Convention.
This inconsistency will no doubt prove troublesome for parties seeking to evaluate their rights and obligations under contracts covered by
the Convention, for their lawyers, and for courts interpreting this new
law. In addition, article 28 threatens to undermine the Convention's
remedial scheme and to prevent uniformity in this important aspect of
international sales. This Article will explore the remedial provisions
of the Convention and some of the issues raised by the uneasy compromise over the right to require performance. Part I will describe the
Convention's remedial provisions, illuminated by their drafting history. Part II will evaluate the ability of parties to vary these remedies,
and will consider, in particular, the parties' ability to waive or require
the remedy of specific performance contractually. A concluding section will offer some general observations regarding interpretation of
the Sales Convention.
I.

THE CONVENTION AND THE RIGHT TO
PERFORMANCE

The remedial provisions of the Sales Convention will at first seem
familiar to most American lawyers. A section on damages, articles 74
to 77, sets forth familiar formulae based on market differential,2 8
resale price,29 and the cost of cover,3" and it establishes limitations
based on foreseeability3 1 and mitigation.3 2 However, further study
will reveal a crucial difference between the Convention and the Anglo25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
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Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(l).
Id. art. 62.
Id. art. 28, quoted in full at text accompanying note 84 infra.
Id. art. 76.
Id. art. 75.
Id.
Id. art. 74.
Id. art. 77.

Requiring Performance in International Sales
American common law: the remedial provisions of the Convention

establish a clear right to performance for both buyers and sellers.
Under these provisions, an aggrieved party may choose either to
require the breaching party fully to perform the contract or to seek

substitutional damages. 3
A.

The Right to Performance
The Convention provides that the buyer has a right to require the

seller to perform the contract in article 46(1): "The buyer may require
performance by the seller of [his] obligations unless the buyer has
'34
resorted to a remedy which is inconsistent with this requirement.
In a typical case, the seller may breach the contract by refusing to
deliver the goods. This is the situation most clearly addressed by arti-

cle 46(1). 3 1 In addition, however, the seller may breach his obligations
regarding documents of sale or delivery. A seller may, for example,
fail to present a certificate of ownership or to deliver appropriate bills
of lading or warehouse receipts.36 The right to performance in article
46(1) apparently includes the right to require the seller to perform

these documentary obligations as well as the obligation to deliver the
goods.3 7

A similar right is given to the seller in article 62: "The seller may
require the buyer to pay the price, take delivery or perform his other
obligations, unless the seller has resorted to a remedy which is incon-

sistent with this requirement. ' '38 Under this provision, a seller may
33. Where the goods do not conform with the contract, an aggrieved buyer also may choose
to reduce the price to reflect any reduction in value resulting from the defect. Id. art. 50.
34. Id. art. 46(1).
35. See Commentary on the Draft Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods,
Prepared by the Secretariat, art. 42, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/5 (1979) [hereinafter 1978
Commentary on the Draft Convention], reprintedin OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 14, 38.
Although this draft Commentary was never formally adopted, still it is a useful source for
interpretation of the Convention. See Winship, Note on the Commentary of the 1980 Vienna
Convention, 18 INT'L LAW. 37 (1984).
36. Article 34 recognizes that many international sales contracts impose documentary
obligations on the seller:
If the seller is bound to hand over documents relating to the goods, he must hand them
over at the time and place and in the form required by the contract. If the seller has handed
over documents before that time, he may, up to that time, cure any lack of conformity in the
documents, if the exercise of this right does not cause the buyer unreasonable inconvenience
or unreasonable expense. However, the buyer retains any right to claim damages as
provided for in this Convention.
Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 34.
37. See 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supranote 35, art. 42, para. 3 ("The seller
must deliver the goods or any missing part, cure any defects or do any other act necessary for the
contract to be performed as originally agreed."); Ziegel, supra note 18.
38. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 62.
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require the buyer to pay the price or to perform other obligations, even
if the buyer refuses to accept the goods.39
Although these provisions are phrased in terms of the "rights" of
the parties, the Secretariat's Commentary clearly indicates that they
were intended to act as directives to a court in the event of litigation.'
If the seller refuses to deliver, article 46 directs a court to order specific performance, subject to article 28. Similarly, if the buyer wrongfully rejects the goods, article 62 directs a court to order payment of
the price.
The drafting history of the Convention suggests several reasons justifying a broad right to performance. First, several delegates expressed
the belief that a party to a contract is entitled to full performance by
virtue of the agreement itself, and that the law should not force a nonbreaching party to accept anything less.41 Second, buyers of goods
39. See P. SCHLECHTRIEM, UNIFORM SALES LAW: THE UN- CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS
FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 84 (Eng. trans. 1986); Ziegel, supra note 18, at 9-30;
see also Hellner, The UN Convention on InternationalSales of Goods-An Outsider's View, in lus
INTER NATIONE: FESTSCHRIFr FOR STEFAN RIESENFELD 71, 88-89 (1983)

(discussing

ambiguities in article 62 and related provisions); cf J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, §§ 347-49, at
356-59 (emphasizing limitations on the right of a seller to sue for the price after wrongful
rejection imposed by articles 28, 85, and 88).
40. 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 42, para. 8:
The style in which article 42 in particular and Section III on the buyer's remedies in
general is drafted should be noted. That style conforms to the view in many legal systems
that a legislative text on the law of sales governs the rights and obligations between the

parties and does not consist of directives addressed to a tribunal. In other legal systems the
remedies available to one party on the other party's failure to perform are stated in terms of
the injured party's right to the judgement of a court granting the requested relief. However,
these two different styles of legislative drafting are intended to achieve the same result.
Therefore, when article 42(l) provides that "the buyer may require performance by the
seller", it anticipates that, if the seller does not perform, a court will order such performance
and will enforce that order by the means available to it under its procedural law.
(Footnote omitted.) See also id. art. 58, para. 5 (similar discussion of the drafting style of article
62).
41. See, e.g., Summary Records of the First Committee (18th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/
C.1/SR.18 (1980) [hereinafter Summary Records (18th mtg.)], reprinted in OFFICIAL RECORDS,
supra note 1, at 328, 331-32:
60. Mr. HOSOKAWA (Japan) said that... [i]t seemed obvious to him that, once a buyer
had concluded a contract which bound the seller to perform his obligation, that buyer

should have the right to demand performance.
63. Mr. HJERNER (Sweden) said . . . [that] [e]ven if the buyer was able to purchase
substitute commodities elsewhere on the market, he should still have the right to hold to the
contract and to expect that the seller's promise would be honoured.
64. Mr. GHESTIN (France) said . . . [that] [t]he result of such an amendment [limiting
the right to performance] would be to encourage the seller to dishonour his obligations if the
product he was selling was available on the market. Recourse to damage did not seem to
him a satisfactory solution; the essential remedy was to secure performance of the contract.

Requiring Performance in International Sales
from other countries often are unable to obtain alternative sources of
supply in the quantities and with the qualities needed.4 2 Finally, if an
aggrieved party's primary remedy is damages, then litigation frequently will be required to fix the extent of liability, resulting in cost
and delay.43
Accordingly, the Convention gives an aggrieved party the right to
choose between specific performance and damages. This approach
takes on added importance because, in many cases, particularly in
international trade, an award of damages will not fully compensate for
an aggrieved party's losses. In order to cover, for example, a buyer
will incur the costs of finding an alternative supplier and negotiating a
new deal. Although the Convention entitles a buyer to recover foreseeable incidental damages,' these costs often involve the expenditure
of time rather than cash, and it is difficult to establish an accurate
monetary value for time and effort.4 5 Similarly, resale by a seller may

entail costs in time and effort that may not be compensated in a damage award.
42. 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 42, para. 2:
[I]f the buyer needs the goods in the quantities and with the qualities ordered, he may not be
able to make substitute purchases in the time necessary. This is particularly true if
alternative sources of supply are in other countries, as will often be the case when the
contract was an international contract of sale.
43. See id. ("Legal actions for damages cost money and may take a considerable period of
time."). Of course litigation costs and delay also occur in actions for specific performance. The
Secretariat's comment must assume that if the law clearly establishes a right to full performance,
then a seller is more likely to perform, or at least to negotiate an acceptable settlement with the
buyer. The validity of this assumption can be proved only by detailed empirical study. One could
speculate, however, that so long as the cost of replacement is the same for both buyer and seller,
and assuming that the seller does not save more money from the delay than it costs him to
litigate the dispute, then it will be cheaper for the seller to perform than it would be for him to
await an eventual suit for specific performance or damages. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at
285-86.
44. See Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 74. Article 74 provides as follows:
Damages for breach of contract by one party consist of a sum equal to the loss, including
loss of profit, suffered by the other party as a consequence of the breach. Such damages may
not exceed the loss which the party in breach foresaw or ought to have foreseen at the time
of the conclusion of the contract, in the light of the facts and matters of which he knew or
ought to have known, as a possible consequence of the breach of contract.
Id. Although the cost of arranging cover or resale normally would be foreseeable at the time of
the contract, costs resulting from sudden shortages or the like may be treated as unforeseeable by
some courts. See generally J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, §§ 406-07, at 410-11; Ziegel, supra note
18, at 9-37 to 9-38.
45. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 276; cf Brown, Specific Performance in a Planned
Economy, in PAPERS AND COMMENTS DELIVERED AT THE EIGHTH ANNUAL WORKSHOP ON
COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW 35, 37 (J. Ziegel ed. 1980) (arguing that damage awards are
likely to be inadequate for breaches of relational contracts).
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In addition, a court may err in its estimate of compensatory damages, that is, the additional cost to the buyer of substitute goods, the
difference in value between the contract goods and the available substitutes, and any other losses caused by the breach.4 6 The risk of error is
particularly acute in cases involving international sales, because identical products are not common in the international market. If a seller
has breached, for example, and the buyer is unable to find an exact
substitute, then the court must estimate any difference in value to the
buyer between the original contract item and the closest substitute.
Numerous types of product differentiation are likely. Purchases from
alternative suppliers may come with reduced warranties, less brand
name recognition, or diminished quality. The diminution in value
caused by these differences is difficult to prove with certainty and difficult for a court to evaluate.
The Convention's principal remedial provisions resolve this problem
by permitting the aggrieved party to determine whether damages will
fully compensate for any loss. 47 If an award of damages would not be
sufficient, then the aggrieved party may choose court-ordered performance. Under this remedy, the breaching party will directly bear all
losses caused by the breach.4 8
B.

Limitations on the Right to Performance

The Convention recognizes several significant limitations on the
right to performance. Article 28 will be discussed separately below.
The remaining limitations generally define the circumstances in which
it would be unfair or unwise to allow the aggrieved party to insist on
full performance. Articles 46 and 62 expressly provide that the right
to performance cannot be enforced if the aggrieved party has resorted
to an inconsistent alternative remedy. 49 The buyer, for example, may
46. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 275-77 (discussing reasons why courts' estimates of
substitutional damages often may be inaccurate); Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance:
Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 341, 363 (1984) (emphasizing
the difficulty for a court in accurately assessing substitutional damages).
47. See 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 26, para. 4 (discussing
the original draft of article 28):
It should be noted that articles [46] and [62], where not limited by this article [28], have
the effect of changing the remedy of obtaining an order by a court that a party perform the
contract from a limited remedy, which in many circumstances is available only at the
discretion of the court, to a remedy available at the discretion of the other party.
(Emphasis added.)
48. The parties may agree to some other allocation, either following the breach or in the
original contract. For further discussion of contractual terms regarding specific performance, see
infra notes 160-90 and accompanying text.
49. Sales Convention, supra note 1, arts. 42, 62.
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have declared the contract avoided under article 49,50 in which case
the buyer may seek only damages.5 1 Similarly, enforcement of the
right to performance would be inappropriate if the buyer has "reduced
the price" under article 50.2 Likewise, a seller may lose the right to
payment under article 62 by declaring the contract avoided under article 64.13
50. Id. art. 49. Article 49 provides as follows:
(1) The buyer may declare the contract avoided:
(a) if the failure by the seller to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this
Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; or
(b) in case of non-delivery, if the seller does not deliver the goods within the additional
period of time fixed by the buyer in accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47 or
declares that he will not deliver within the period so fixed.
(2) However, in cases where the seller has delivered the goods, the buyer loses the right
to declare the contract avoided unless he does so:
(a) in respect of late delivery, within a reasonable time after he has become aware that
delivery has been made;
(b) in respect of any breach other than late delivery, within a reasonable time:
(i) after he knew or ought to have known of the breach;
(ii) after the expiration of any additional period of time fixed by the buyer in
accordance with paragraph (1) of article 47, or after the seller has declared
that he will not perform his obligations within such an additional period; or
(iii) after the expiration of any additional period of time indicated by the seller in
accordance with paragraph (2) of article 48, or after the buyer has declared
that he will not accept performance.
Id.
51. See Ziegel, supra note 18, at 9-9.
52. Article 50 provides as follows:
If the goods do not conform with the contract and whether or not the price has already
been paid, the buyer may reduce the price in the same proportion as the value that the goods
actually delivered had at the time of the delivery bears to the value that conforming goods
would have had at that time. However, if the seller remedies any failure to perform his
obligations in accordance with article 37 or article 48 or if the buyer refuses to accept
performance by the seller in accordance with those articles, the buyer may not reduce the
price.
Sales Convention, supra note I, art. 50.
53. Article 64 provides as follows:
(1) The seller may declare the contract avoided:
(a) if the failure by the buyer to perform any of his obligations under the contract or this
Convention amounts to a fundamental breach of contract; or
(b) if the buyer does not, within the additional period of time fixed by the seller in
accordance with paragraph (1) of article 63, perform his obligation to pay the price
or take delivery of the goods, or if he declares that he will not do so within the
period so fixed.
(2) However, in cases where the buyer has paid the price, the seller loses the right to
declare the contract avoided unless he does so:
(a) in respect of late performance by the buyer, before the seller has become aware that
performance has been rendered; or
(b) in respect of any breach other than late performance by the buyer, within a
reasonable time:
(i) after the seller knew or ought to have known of the breach; or
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Subsections (2) and (3) of article 46 also limit the buyer's right to
full performance where the seller has delivered goods that do not conform to the contract specifications or are otherwise defective. 4 Under
subsection (2), the buyer has a right to substitute goods only if the
defect is serious enough to constitute a "fundamental breach," that is,
if the defect substantially deprives the buyer of what the buyer is entitled to expect from the contract." Similarly, subsection (3) gives the
buyer a right to require the seller to repair the defect only if requiring
(ii)

after the expiration of any additional period of time fixed by the seller in
accordance with paragraph (1) of article 63, or after the buyer has declared
that he will not perform his obligations within such an additional period.

Id. art. 64.
54. The Convention recognizes that quality requirements may be either spoken or unspoken.
Fortunately, however, the Convention avoids the complexity of Anglo-American warranty law
by focusing on the notion of conformity instead of on the notion of implied warranty. Article 35
provides as follows:
(1) The seller must deliver goods which are of the quantity, quality and description
required by the contract and which are contained or packaged in the manner required by the
contract.
(2) Except where the parties have agreed otherwise, the goods do not conform with the
contract unless they:
(a) are fit for the purposes for which goods of the same description would ordinarily be
used;
(b) are fit for any particular purpose expressly or impliedly made known to the seller at
the time of the conclusion of the contract, except where the circumstances show that
the buyer did not rely, or that it was unreasonable for him to rely, on the seller's skill
and judgment;
(c) possess the qualities of goods which the seller has held out to the buyer as a sample
or model;
(d) are contained or packaged in the manner usual for such goods or, where there is no
such manner, in a manner adequate to preserve and protect the goods.
(3) The seller is not liable under subparagraphs (a) to (d) of the preceding paragraph for
any lack of conformity of the goods if at the time of the conclusion of the contract the buyer
knew or could not have been unaware of such lack of conformity.
Id. art. 35. See generally J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 224, at 251-52.
55. Article 46(2) provides as follows:
(2) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require delivery of
substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a fundamental breach of contract
and a request for substitute goods is made either in conjunction with notice given under
article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter.
Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(2).
Article 25 defines fundamental breach as follows:
A breach of contract committed by one of the parties is fundamental if it results in such
detriment to the other party as substantially to deprive him of what he is entitled to expect
under the contract, unless the party in breach did not foresee and a reasonable person of the
same kind in the same circumstances would not have foreseen such a result.
Id. art. 25; see Ziegel, The Vienna InternationalSales Convention, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 38, 43 (1982) (observing that the
Convention's test for fundamental breach is more demanding than that for substantial performance in the common law).

Requiring Performance in International Sales
repair is not unreasonable under all of the circumstances. 56 Presumably it would be unreasonable to compel the seller to repair if repair is
technically infeasible or if the cost of repair exceeds the diminution in
value to the buyer s7 caused by the defect."8 If the defect is not substantial and repair is unreasonable, the buyer retains the right under
article 50 to reduce the price to reflect any diminution in value.59
These limitations on the buyer's right to performance are designed to
avoid economic waste where the seller has substantially performed or
where the cost of repair exceeds the benefit to be gained.'
In addition to the express limitations within articles 46 and 62, article 7 implicitly requires that the right to performance be exercised in
good faith. Article 7 requires that in interpreting the Convention,
regard should be had to "the observance of good faith in international
trade., 6 1 Although the principle of good faith is not clearly defined
and its placement in the Convention is problematic,6' it is appropriate
56. Article 46(3) provides as follows:
(3) If the goods do not conform with the contract, the buyer may require the seller to
remedy the lack of conformity by repair, unless this is unreasonable having regard to all the
circumstances. A request for repair must be made either in conjunction with notice given
under article 39 or within a reasonable time thereafter.
Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(3). See generally J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 284, at
301.
57. The loss in value presumably should be based on the buyer's subjective value. Cf Sales
Convention, supra note 1, art. 74 (damages based on "loss ...suffered by the other party as a
consequence of the breach"); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 comment b (1981)
("In principle, this requires a determination of the values of those performances to the injured
party himself and not their values to some hypothetical reasonable person or on some market.").
58. The reasonableness requirement in article 46(3) might also be read to focus solely on the
cost of repair without regard to the buyer's loss: If repairs are very costly, then they are
unreasonable. Yet this approach unduly restricts the right to repair. Cf.Ziegel, supranote 18, at
9-17 n.45 ("Presumably, the severity of the defect, the prejudice to the buyer, and the cost to the
seller of repairing goods that may be a long distance from the seller's place of business will all be
relevant considerations.").
59. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 50.
60. See 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 42, para. 12; J.
HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 283, at 301.
61. Article 7 provides as follows:
(1) In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to its international
character and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of
good faith in international trade.
(2) Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly
settled in it are to be settled in conformity [with] the general principles on which it is based
or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity [with] the law applicable by virtue of the
rules of private international law.
Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 7.
62. Some delegates argued that the obligation of good faith should be treated as a part of the
parties' contractual obligations, rather than as a principle for interpretation of the Convention.
See, e.g., Summary Records of the FirstCommittee (5th mtg.), U.N. Doe. A/CONF.97/C.1/SR.5
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to interpret the rights to performance granted in articles 46 and 62
consistently with a general obligation of good faith. The recognition
of a right to performance should not permit one party to inflict undue
pain or punishment on the breaching party, and article 7 authorizes
63
the court to prohibit such bad faith behavior.
A good faith limitation on the right to performance may be especially important in cases of impossibility or impracticability. Article
79 excuses a party from liability for damages where that party
"prove[s] that the failure [to perform] was due to an impediment
beyond his control."' However, subsection (5) of article 79 expressly
limits this excuse to damage claims: "Nothing in this article prevents
either party from exercising any right other than to claim damages
under this Convention."6 5 As the Secretariat's Commentary explains:
(1980), reprinted in OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 254, 257-59. As to the obligation of
good faith generally, see 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 6, at
17-18; J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 94, at 123-24; Ersi, GeneralProvisions,in INTERNATIONAL
SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE

OF GOODS 2-1, 2-6 to 2-8 (1984).
63. This may prove to be a significant limitation where, for example, a party delays an action
for performance in order to speculate on the market or until there has been a market collapse, or
where a party pursues specific performance for the purpose of harassing the other party or in
circumstances where specific performance will be particularly onerous to the breaching party.
See J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 95, at 125, § 193, at 222-23, § 285, at 302.
64. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 79. Article 79 provides as follows:
(1) A party is not liable for a failure to perform any of his obligations if he proved that
the failure was due to an impediment beyond his control and that he could not reasonably be
expected to have taken the impediment into account at the time of the conclusion of the
contract or to have avoided or overcome it or its consequences.
(2) If the party's failure is due to the failure by a third person whom he has engaged to
perform the whole or a part of the contract, that party is exempt from liability only if:
(a) he is exempt under the preceding paragraph; and
(b) the person whom he has so engaged would be so exempt if the provisions of that
paragraph were applied to him.
(3) The exemption provided by this article has effect for the period during which the
impediment exists.
(4) The party who fails to perform must give notice to the other party of the impediment
and its effect on his ability to perform. If the notice is not received by the other party within
a reasonable time after the party who fails to perform knew or ought to have known of the
impediment, he is liable for damages resulting from such non-receipt.
(5) Nothing in this article prevents either party from exercising any right other than to
claim damages under this Convention.
Id. See generally Nicholas, Force Majeure and Frustration, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 231 (1979);
Ziegel, supra note 55, at 49-50.
65. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 79(5). See generally P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note
39, at 102-03 (discussing rejection of German and Norwegian proposals to extinguish obligor's
obligation to perform in cases of exemption); Hellner, The Vienna Convention and Standard
Form Contracts, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: DUBROVNIK LECTURES 335, 354 (1986).
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The effect of article [79](1) in conjunction with article [79](5) is to
exempt the non-performing party only from liability for damages. All of
the other remedies are available to the other party, i.e. demand for performance, reduction of the price or avoidance of the contract.
However, if the party who is required to overcome an impediment
does so by furnishing a substitute performance, the other party could
avoid the contract only if that substitute performance was so deficient in
comparison with the performance stipulated in the contract that it constituted a fundamental breach of contract.6 6

If one party is confronted by an impediment, the other party still
has a right to performance but may be required to accept a substitute
performance.67 This suggests that the principle of good faith is an
essential aspect of the right to performance. Good faith also may
require that the breaching party be relieved even of the obligation to
make a substitute performance if this is exceptionally burdensome. 6
Some commentators have argued that article 77, interpreted as a
general duty to mitigate damages, imposes an additional limitation on
the right to performance.6 9 It is doubtful, however, that the duty to
mitigate loss recognized in article 77 limits the right of performance
granted by articles 46 or 62.70 Article 77 provides as follows:
A party who relies on a breach of contract must take such measures
as are reasonable in the circumstances to mitigate the loss, including loss

of profit, resulting from the breach. If he fails to take such measures,
66. 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 65, para. 8.
67. See Nicholas, supra note 64, at 241.
68. Cf P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 39, at 102-03 (noting general consensus at the Vienna
Convention that it would be wrong to order specific performance of a physically impossible task);
Drobnig, General Principlesof European Contract Law, in INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS:
DUBROVNIK LECTURES 305, 321 (1986) (noting that Continental and Anglo-American law agree
that it is inappropriate to order specific performance where there is factual or legal impossibility).
69. See, e-g., J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 285, at 302, §§ 418-19, at 418-21. Professor
Honnold argues that such a duty to mitigate would be important to prevent injustice and waste
in a case, for example, where shortly after placing an order the buyer notifies the seller that he
will not be able to use the goods, but the seller nevertheless continues production of the goods
and eventually sues the buyer for the price. Id § 418, at 419; Summary Records of the First
Committee (30th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/SR.30 (1980) [hereinafter Summary Records
(30th mtg.)], reprinted in OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at 393, 396 (discussion by Mr.
Honnold (United States), quoted infra note 83); see also id, at 396-97 (Mr. Alkin (Ireland)
argued that the first sentence of article 77 establishes a general duty to mitigate applicable to any
remedy and that the second sentence is just one of several possible consequences of a failure to
mitigate. Professor Honnold responded that although he hoped such an interpretation would be
made, he doubted that the provision would be read in that way.).
70. Cf Ulen, supra note 46, at 390-93 (noting that the duty to mitigate does not apply in an
action for specific performance under United States law and concluding that a rule favoring
specific performance nevertheless would not inefficiently induce promisees to increase their
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the party in breach may claim a reduction in the damages in the amount
by which the loss should have been mitigated.71
Article 77 imposes a duty on an aggrieved party to take reasonable
steps to reduce his or her loss. This presumably includes the purchase
of substitute goods by an aggrieved buyer, or the resale of the contract
goods by an aggrieved seller.7 2 If this provision applies under articles
46 and 62, then article 77 would effectively preclude the buyer from
exercising the right to performance whenever substitute goods are reasonably available and it would bar the seller from recovering payment
of the price whenever it was reasonably possible to resell the goods.
Article 77 would mean, in other words, that the aggrieved party must
mitigate loss through the choice of remedy.
This suggestion that article 77 limits the right to performance is
refuted, however, by the language of article 77, the structure of the
Convention, and the Convention's drafting history. 73 First, the second
sentence of article 77 specifies the consequences for failure to mitigate
one's losses: The breaching party may claim a reduction in damages.
Under this wording, the duty to mitigate applies only when the
aggrieved party claims damages, not when that party pursues the right
to performance.
Moreover, article 77 is placed within a section of the Convention
entitled "damages." Article 45, which specifies the remedies available
to a buyer, distinguishes between the rights established in articles 46 to
52 and damages as provided in articles 74 to 77.74 Article 61, dealing
with a seller's remedies, makes a similar distinction between the right
to performance and a claim for damages. 75 The organization of these
remedial provisions creates an important distinction between the right
to performance and a claim for damages, including the duty to mitigate damages in article 77.
Finally, the drafting history clearly indicates that article 77 does not
limit the right to performance in articles 46 and 62.76 The Secretariat's Commentary, written in 1977, explicitly states that article 77
71. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 77.
72. See generally J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, §§ 418-19, at 418-21; Farnsworth, supra note
18, at 251.
73. See generally Farnsworth, supra note 18, at 249-51 (concluding that article 77 does not
apply to an action for specific performance); Heliner, supra note 39, at 98-99 (concluding that
article 77 does not apply to an action for enforced performance under articles 46 or 62); Ziegel,
supra note 18, at 9-41 to 9-42 (noting significant "hurdles" to application of article 77 in an
action for specific relief).
74. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 45.
75. Id. art. 61.
76. See Farnsworth, supra note 18, at 250.
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does not affect the seller's claim for payment of the price under article
62.17 Thereafter, several amendments that would have imposed a duty
to mitigate under articles 46 and 62 were introduced and rejected at
the 1980 Vienna Conference. The United States proposed to amend
article 46 so as to deny the buyer a right to performance "if he could
purchase substitute goods without [unreasonable] [substantial] additional expense or inconvenience."" 8 A similar amendment to article
62 would have denied the seller a right to payment of the price "if the
buyer has not taken delivery of the goods and the seller can resell the

goods without [unreasonable] [substantial] additional expense or
inconvenience." 7 9 The delegates rejected these amendments by a substantial margin,"0 following debate in which several of the delegates
stated that the United States proposal would deprive the buyer of his
contractual right to performance and would cause great uncertainty in

international contracts.8 "
77. 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 73, para. 3 (article 62 was
then numbered 58).
78. Analysis of Comments and Proposalsby Governments and InternationalOrganizationson
the Draft Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods and on Draft Provisions
Concerning Implementation, Reservations and Other FinalClauses, Prepared by the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/9 (1980) [hereinafter Analysis of Comments and Proposals],
reprinted in OrrICIAL REcoRDs, supra note 1, at 71, 78; Report of the First Committee, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.97/ 1 (1980) [hereinafter Report of the FirstCommittee], reprintedin OFFICIAL
RacoRDs, supra note 1, at 82, 111.
79. Analysis of Comments and Proposals,supra note 78, at 71, 79. This second proposal was
never formally introduced. Report of the FirstCommittee, supra note 78, at 82, 124.
80. See Report of the First Committee, supra note 78, at 82, 113 (vote of 34 to 7).
81. See Summary Records (18th mtg.), supra note 41, at 330, 331-32:
58.

Mr. MASKOW (German Democratic Republic) said that... the amendment would

decisively reduce the buyer's freedom to limit the legal consequences of defects, a freedom
which was widespread in commercial life and which should be extended rather than
restricted.
59. Mr. HERBER (Federal Republic of Germany) . . . [stated that] [t]he proposed
amendment would, in effect, do away with the right of the buyer to require specific
performance and thus went further than article 25 of [the Uniform Law on International
Sales], which had permitted such a practice only in cases where it was in keeping with
established usage. To introduce into the Convention a general rule of that kind covering all
types of international sales would mean in practice that no provision was made under any
legislation for any right of specific performance.
61. Mr. SAMI (Iraq) supported that view. The proposal laid down a requirement for a
specific course of action to be followed by the buyer in the event that the seller did not meet
his obligations, namely that he should himself purchase substitute goods. That principle
was a dangerous one which he found unacceptable.
66. Mr. DABIN (Belgium) said... [that] [t]he question at issue was not so much the
specific one of enforcing performance, but rather the general principle of honoring
obligations under a contract, one of the cornerstones of the Convention. The proposal
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Despite this defeat, the United States proposed to amend article 77
to provide that a failure to mitigate would allow the breaching party
not only to reduce any damage claim but also to claim "a corresponding modification or adjustment of any other remedy." 2 A large
majority of the delegates decisively rejected this attempt to limit the
s3
right to performance by imposing a duty to mitigate.
Article 77 therefore does not apply to articles 46 and 62 and does
not directly limit the right to performance. Moreover, article 77
should not be applied to limit a monetary component of a right to
specific performance. Under article 46, for example, a buyer may
require the seller to deliver the contract goods. If the seller refuses,
the buyer may seek an order of specific performance requiring the
seller to deliver the goods. If the time of eventual delivery is after the
contract delivery date, the judgment of specific performance may
would encourage sellers to evade their obligations on the pretext that the buyer had the
option of securing his goods elsewhere.
82. Report of the First Committee, supra note 78, at 82, 133; see Analysis of Comments and
Proposals, supra note 78, at 71, 81. This proposal was offered as an alternative to the United
States' proposed amendment to article 62 which would condition the seller's right to recover the
price on reasonable attempt to resell. Analysis of Comments and Proposals,supra. at 81.
83. See Report of the First Committee, supra note 78, at 82, 133. During debate on this
amendment, several delegates responded directly to a case posed by Mr. Honnold (United States)
that "a buyer might realize, shortly after placing an order, that he would be unable to use the
goods; he therefore proposed to the seller that he should pay him damages and asked him not to
go ahead with the order; but the seller ignored his request and used materials and labour in
producing the goods," Summary Records (30th mtg.), supra note 69, at 393, 396:
64. Mr. ZIEGEL (Canada) said that ...[a]rticle [77] only applied to cases where a party
relied on a breach of contract; in those cases, and in those cases only, the party concerned
was required to take measures to mitigate the loss. However, if the seller or the buyer
wished to require performance of the contract, he did not rely on a breach, and the situation
was reversed.
65. According to the reasoning of the United States representative, if an innocent party
was obliged to accept the repudiation of an obligation, it was not entitled to require specific
performance. That point of view might, perhaps, be in line with the practice in common law
countries, but it was not in line with the principles underlying the Convention, according to
which the buyer and the seller had an absolute right to require specific performance so long
as they had not had recourse to inconsistent remedies. In the case cited by the United States
representative, the seller had not had recourse to such remedies; he simply wished to
exercise his right to performance of the contract, which no provision in the Convention
denied him....
67. Mr. MANTILLA-MOLINA (Mexico) said... [that] [i]n
the case cited by the United
States representative, the fact that the buyer changed his mind did not constitute avoidance
of the contract and the seller was entitled to proceed with manufacture since nothing had
released him from his obligations. It was reasonable that the seller should seek to recover
the price, and it would be unreasonable if, as proposed by the United States, the price could
be reduced. He did not see why there should be such a reduction, since the seller had not
committed any wrong, or how it would be determined.
Id. at 397.
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include an order that the seller pay the buyer an amount of money to
compensate for the delay. Yet the monetary order is merely supplementary; it is not a substitute for full performance, and it should not
be subject to the mitigation rule of article 77.
C. Article 28
The limitations on the right to performance discussed thus far define
situations in which the exercise of that right would be unfair or wasteful. They complement the right to performance and establish a principled system of contract remedies. Article 28, in contrast, subverts this
system by preserving and privileging domestic law on specific performance. This section creates an irreconcilable conflict in the Convention's remedial provisions. The following discussion focuses first on
the rationale for article 28 and then on its application.
L

Rationale
Article 28 provides:
If, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, one party is
entitled to require performance of any obligation by the other party, a
court is not bound to enter a judgment for specific performance unless
the court would do so under its own law8 in
respect of similar contracts
4
of sale not governed by this Convention.

The primary purpose of article 28 is to preserve domestic law
regarding the availability of specific performance. A court is not
required to order specific performance under the Convention unless it
would do so in a similar case under its own law. 5
The drafting history of article 28 reveals two separate reasons for its
adoption. First, under some legal systems, courts simply do not have
the recognized authority or the procedural mechanism to order specific performance.8 6 The Convention's drafters thought it would be
inappropriate to require such nations to develop an injunction mechanism merely to implement the Sales Convention. 7 Early drafts of
84. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 28.
85. See J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, §§ 194-95, at 223-25; cf. P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note
39, at 62-63.
86. Cf Report of the United Nations Commission on InternationalTrade Law on the Work of
its Second Session, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 18) at 85, U.N. Doc. A/7618 (1969) ("the
representative of the United Arab Republic said that the concept of specific performance was
unknown in certain countries").
87. See 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 26, para.,3:
In some legal systems the courts are authorized to order specific performance of an
obligation. In other legal systems courts are not authorized to order certain forms of
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article 28 therefore provided that a court would not be bound to order
88
specific performance unless it "could" do so under its own law.
Under this formulation, a court would not be obligated to order specific performance if its own legal system did not authorize injunctive
orders, but if some such procedure did exist, then the Convention's
general remedial provisions would govern.89
A different rationale for article 28 was advanced by the United
States and the United Kingdom at the 1980 Vienna Conference, in
opposition to the proposed draft. Delegates from the United States
and the United Kingdom argued that an additional purpose of article
28 should be to allow those legal systems that regard specific performance as an exceptional remedy to continue to do so under the Convention. 9° Citing the 1964 Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods, 9 1 these delegates introduced amendments to change the word
"could" in the early drafts of article 28 to "would." 92 The effect of
this amendment was to preserve domestic law regarding the conditions
under which specific performance would be granted. As a result, even
if a nation's courts were authorized to order specific performance of a
contract, they would not be required to do so under the Convention
except in those circumstances indicated by domestic law.

specific performance and those states could not be expected to alter fundamental principles
of their judicial procedure in order to bring this Convention into force.
88. This version of article 28 was drafted by the Working Group on International Sales at its
sixth session in 1975. See Report of the Working Group on the InternationalSale of Goods on the
Work of its Sixth Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/100 (1975) [hereinafter Report of the Working
Group], reprinted in [1975] 6 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L. 49, 54, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/SER.A/1975. The Working Group included representatives from the United Kingdom
and the United States. See supra note 4. This version was approved by UNCITRAL as its final
version. See Text of Draft Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods Approved
by the United NationsCommission on InternationalTrade Law, art. 26, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/
5 (1979) [hereinafter Text of Draft Convention], reprintedin OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra note 1, at
5,7.
89. 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 26, para. 3:
Therefore, if a court has the authority under any circumstances to order a particular form of
specific performance, e.g. to deliver the goods or to pay the price, article 26 does not limit
the application of articles 42 or 58. Article 26 limits their application only if a court could
not under any circumstances order such a form of specific performance.
90. See Summary Records of the First Committee (13th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C.l/
SR.13 (1980) [hereinafter Summary Records (13th mtg.)], reprintedin OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra
note 1, at 302, 304-05.
91. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964,
Annex (Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods), 834 U.N.T.S. 109, 123.
92. Report of the First Committee, supra note 78, at 82, 100.
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Although this amendment met with some opposition,93 it eventually
was approved. 94 This is unfortunate. The original proposal, using the
word "could," successfully protected those few judicial systems that
have no established procedure, for specific performance from the burden of having to develop such a mechanism. The cost in uncertainty
and lack of uniformity of this solution would have been very small;
only a very few nations lack some mechanism for specific performance. The 1980 amendment, in contrast, so broadens the impact of
article 28 that it risks all remedial uniformity and threatens extreme
uncertainty regarding the right to performance. 95 Because parties at
the time of a breach will not know whether the right to performance
will eventually be enforced, it will be very difficult for them to evaluate
and to settle informally their mutual rights and obligations. 96 Indeed,
article 28 may wreak havoc on post-breach negotiations under the
Convention; it undermines articles 46 and 62 because an aggrieved
party must always fear that a court will not order performance.
The reasons given in support of the 1980 amendment are not persuasive. Surely national pride does not justify the amendment-every
provision of the Convention represents a compromise from some
national law. The only substantive claims made in support of limiting
specific performance are that the remedy is unduly harsh, that domestic rules regarding specific performance are so diverse as to defy consensus, and that specific performance is economically inefficient. 97
None is persuasive.
Professor Farnsworth, as a representative of the United States to the
Vienna Conference, argued that specific performance, at least in the
common law, was too harsh a remedy for breach of an international
sales contract:
93. See, eg.. Summary Records (13th mtg.), supra note 90, at 302, 305 ("Mr. WAGNER
(German Democractic Republic) said that his delegation preferred the present text of the
Convention, which it interpreted as a compromise to prevent common law courts from being
compelled to do something which they could not normally do under their law.").
94. See Report of the First Committee, supra note 78, at 82, 100 (vote of 26 to 10).

95. Cf Ziegel, supra note 18, at 9-11 ("[Slince the rules of specific performance differ widely
even among civil law jurisdictions, the results of such an action will depend on the geographical
location of the court before which the action is being brought. This seems regrettable even if it is
unavoidable."). Article 28 also presents the very real danger of manipulative forum-shopping.
See Gonzales, supra note 18, at 98.
96. The impact of article 28 on post-breach negotiations is considered in greater detail infra
notes 104-22 and accompanying text.
97. See Summary Records (18th mtg.), supra note 41, at 328, 330 (debate on United States

proposal to limit performance remedy in article 46).
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In the common law system, the sanction was both severe and effective,
since specific performance was enforced by penalties such as fines (or, in
some jurisdictions, even by imprisonment for contempt of court).
... It was in view of the undue harshness of that remedy (particularly in
the context of international sales) that the drafters of the 1964 ULIS had
rightly limited the role of specific performance .... 98

Yet this argument hardly justifies abandonment of the Convention's
goal of uniformity in the rules regarding the right to performance. If
imprisonment is inappropriate, a court may coerce the parties to perform by other means, such as fines. Indeed the Convention itself could
have specified appropriate methods of enforcement if the harshness of
certain means was found objectionable. But the solution to the problem that some jurisdictions use harsh methods to enforce specific performance orders is hardly to preserve domestic law on specific
performance, as article 28 does.
The second argument advanced in favor of article 28 is that domestic rules on specific performance are so diverse as to defy consensus. 99
However, although the conceptual framework of specific relief varies
in different jurisdictions, still there is fundamental agreement on many
significant points."°° If UNCITRAL and the Vienna Conference had
focused attention on this issue, it is quite possible that some consensus
could have been reached on remaining issues of disagreement.
98. Id. at 331.
99. This argument was made mainly in the form of an assertion that there must be some
compromise between the common law countries on the one hand and the civil law and socialist
nations on the other. See, e.g., Summary Records (13th mtg.), supra note 90, at 302, 304
(Statement of Mr. Feltham (United Kingdom)); see also Gonzales, supra note 18, at 97 (noting
that the United Kingdom delegation rejected the compromise reached by UNCITRAL); cf
Rabel, A Draft of an InternationalLaw of Sales, 5 U. CHI. L. REV. 543, 559 (1938) (reporting
that a drafting committee of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT) found the contrast between common law and civil law too deep to be eradicated
on the issue of specific relief). A related argument is that courts typically have much discretion
in ordering specific performance and that this discretion should be preserved. See, e.g., Bergsten,
The Law of Sales in ComparativeLaw, in LES VENTES INTERNATIONALES DE MARCHANDISES
3, 13 (Y. Guyon ed. 1981) ("It is also a recognition that in many legal systems the courts will use
discretion in enforcing the right and that such discretion is to be preserved by the Convention.").
100. See, e.g., Drobnig, supra note 68, at 321; Von Mehren, A Comparative View of the
Remedies Available to a Party Aggrieved by Nonperformance of a ContractualObligation, in 2
XENION: FESTSCHRIFr FUR PAN. J. ZEPOS 28 (1973); cf Ziegel, supra note 18, at 9-10 (noting
that "the common law is less than consistent in its own position" on specific performance). For
studies of specific relief in various legal systems, see, e.g., G. FRIDMAN, SALE OF GOODS IN
CANADA 397-99 (1973); W. GLOAG, LAW OF SCOTLAND 129-30 (8th ed. 1980); R. LEE, AN
INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 265-67 (5th ed. 1953); Amos, Specific Performance in
French Law, 68 L.Q. REV. 372 (1901); Dawson, supra note 19; Gross, Specific Performance of
Contracts in South Africa, 51 S. AFR. L.J. 347 (1934); Szladits, supra note 19; Walton, Specific
Performance in France, 14 J. COMP. LEGIS. & INT'L L. 130 (1932).
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Perhaps the most influential argument made in favor of article 28
was that specific performance is economically inefficient and therefore
should be discouraged whenever possible.1 0 ' Professor Farnsworth
states this argument in the following terms:
For the good of society, its resources should be efficiently allocated at
every point in time. It is therefore in society's interest that each economic unit reallocate its resources whenever this would lead to greater
efficiency. Even if a party is bound by a contract to allocate his
resources in a particular way, the good of society requires that he break
the contract and reallocate his resources whenever this makes him better
off without making someone else worse off. Since reallocation through
breach will not make the injured party worse off as long as his expectations are protected ...
and will, by hypothesis, make the party in
breach better off, it is in society's interest that the contract be broken
and the resources reallocated. This reasoning supports, for example,
substitutional rather than specific
relief ... because such compulsion
10 2
would discourage reallocation.
The rejection of specific performance as economically inefficient too
easily assumes that substitutional damages actually do fully compensate an injured party for all financial loss, inconvenience, and delay
caused by a contract breach. Indeed, economic analysts have actively
debated the efficiency of specific performance and the most persuasive
conclusion is that specific performance may be the most efficient remedy, even where alternative goods are available to the buyer. This
analysis recommends permitting the aggrieved party to choose
03
between specific performance and damages.1
Briefly, an early analysis concluded that specific performance is frequently inefficient because it prevents a seller from transferring the
goods to a third party who values them more highly and who may put
the goods to more productive use."~ This conclusion can be illus101. See Date-Bah, supra note 18, at 61-62 (offering economic efficiency as the explanation
for article 28); cf Farnsworth, supra note 18, at 250-51 (arguing in favor of broadening
amendment to article 28):
[Under articles 46 and 62] neither seller nor buyer is free to reallocate its resources even if
the other party has a ready market on which it can cover or resell as the case may be and
even if that party is fully compensated for any resulting loss. This would not, perhaps, be a
significant matter if it offended only the sense of pride of those Common law countries
whose history dictates a contrary rule. Its importance lies in its disregard of fundamental
notions of economic&
(Emphasis added.)
102. Farnsworth, supra note 18, at 247-48.
103. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 305.
104. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 55-59, 61 (lst ed. 1972); see also L
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 105-14, 117-19 (3d ed. 1986).
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trated with the classic sale of widgets: Helen contracts to sell 100,000
custom-ground widgets to Joe for 10 cents apiece, for use in his
stroller factory. On the day before Helen is to deliver the widgets to
Joe, Sam calls her and says that he must have 100,000 custom-ground
widgets right away or his bakery ovens will break down. Sam is willing to pay 15 cents apiece. Helen will need another two weeks to complete a new batch of 100,000 widgets for Joe and he will lose $2,000 in
profits as a result of the delay. It is most efficient that Sam get the
widgets because he values them more highly than does Joe, and presumably Sam can put them to a more productive use. If the normal
remedy for breach of contract is damages, then Helen must pay Joe
$2,000, but she still will have an incentive to breach and sell to Sam.
By comparison, it is argued, if Helen were ordered to specifically perform the contract with Joe, then she could not sell to Sam and the
widgets would not be allocated to their highest and most productive
use. 105
Several responses to this view noted that specific performance would
not necessarily prevent the third party, Sam, from getting the widgets
because he could purchase them from Joe, the original buyer, or
Helen, the seller, could negotiate with Joe to share some of the profits
from a sale to Sam in exchange for a release of Joe's claim.106 Following this line of thought, at least one influential commentator nevertheless concluded that specific performance is inefficient because of the
added transaction cost of negotiation, either between the third party
and the original buyer or between the seller and the buyer, either at
07
the time of contract formation or after the breach.
Commentators have made three persuasive responses to the conclusion that specific performance is inefficient. First, the analysis assumes
105. This is a variation on Judge Posner's example. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 57 (1st ed. 1972). Another variation often discussed involves the manufacture of chairs and
tables by Athos and his dealings with the three other Musketeers. See Linzer, On the Amorality
of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111,
114-15 (1981); Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947,
951-52 (1982).
106. See, e.g., Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 353 & n.12, 373
(1978); Macneil, supra note 105; Schwartz, supra note 20, at 284-91; Ulen, supra note 46, at 370,
379-96. Judge Posner's original analysis of specific performance recognized the possibility of
such transfers, but did not treat it as significant to the analysis. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 57 (1st ed. 1972).
107. See Kronman, supra note 106, at 365-69 (concluding that a rule favoring specific
performance would increase the cost of negotiations during formation of the contract). This
article influenced the retention of the traditional preference against specific performance in the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts. Linzer, supra note 105, at 124. See generally id. at 120-26
(reviewing debate over the specific performance section of the Restatement (Second)).
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that an award of damages will fully compensate the original buyer,
Joe, and therefore that denial of specific performance would not result
in undercompensation. Professor Alan Schwartz has persuasively discredited this assumption. 1 8 The purchase of substitute items and an
award of damages will not always put a buyer in as good a position as
he or she would have been in if the contract had been performed or if
specific performance were ordered." 9 Moreover, the buyer is in the
best position to evaluate whether cover and a damage award will best
suit the buyer's needs. Finally, the buyer has an incentive to choose
damages whenever that remedy is viable, because an action for specific
relief entails costs and delay in delivery of the required goods. 110
Second, the economic efficiency argument concludes that parties
prefer the remedy of specific performance only if the goods are
unique.11 1 However, several scholars have demonstrated that parties
would be likely to agree to specific performance whenever the promisee either values the contract goods more highly than does the market
accurate damage judgment will be unobtainable or
or fears that an
12

uncollectable. 1
Third, the argument that specific performance is inefficient fails to
consider the enormous expense required to establish a damage award.
Professor Ulen has pointed out that overall transaction costs from a
rule routinely allowing specific performance surely will be lower than
a rule preferring damages because specific performance leaves to the
parties and their private negotiations the cost of ascertaining each
party's valuation of the goods and losses from the breach. 1 3 If spe108. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 275-78. Professor Yorio has responded that
substitutionary damage awards could be made more accurate. Yorio, In Defense of Money
Damagesfor Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1365, 1388-1424 (1982). However, there is
no evidence that such a change will happen.
109. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text. Similarly, there are situations in which
the seller will not be fully compensated by a salvage or resale of the goods and a damage award.
110. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 277; see also supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
111. Professor Kronman concludes that, if left to their own negotiations, the parties would
prefer specific performance only where the goods are unique. Kronman, supra note 106, at
365-69.
112. See, eg., Linzer, supra note 105, at 125 (concluding that a promisee would bargain for
specific performance whenever his damages "cannot be ascertained by a market evaluation");
Schwartz, supra note 20, at 279-84 (arguing first that it is exceedingly difficult to derive any
general rule regarding parties' preferences and second that the promisee is likely to be concerned
not only with the nature of the goods, but also with the likelihood of obtaining and enforcing an
accurate damage award); Ulen, supra note 46, at 375-76 (focusing on the importance of
subjective valuations by the promisee).
113. See Ulen, supra note 46, at 364-403; cf Schwartz, supra note 20, at 284-91 (concluding
that a rule routinely allowing specific performance will not increase post-breach transaction
costs). Professor Yorio has responded that post-breach transaction costs will be higher under a
rule favoring specific performance because it is generally cheaper for disappointed buyers to
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cific performance is the normal remedy for breach, then a seller desiring to sell to a third party or a buyer wanting to cancel his order will
be likely to negotiate with the other side, either before or after a
breach, in an effort to get a release from the contract. During these
negotiations, each party will set a value on the contract and bargain
accordingly. In this way, the parties themselves value the contract
and their losses. On the other hand, if the normal remedy is damages,
1 14
the courts must estimate these values in litigation.
In those cases where buyers do seek specific performance, cover and
damages likely will significantly undercompensate them.1 15 The question, then, is whether the additional transaction costs caused by specific performance outweigh the costs of undercompensation caused by
denying specific relief. Although this question is very difficult to
answer,' 1 6 Professor Schwartz concludes that the costs of undercompensation are greater,117 and this conclusion is strongly supported by
Professor Ulen's point that the litigation and negotiation costs of damage awards outweigh those under a specific performance rule.' 18
Either way, the efficiency losses involved are very small, probably
insignificant. One might then appropriately turn to other considerations, such as the goal of full compensation,1 19 the moral convention of
promising,"' a community's sense of justice, relational and cooperational norms, 12 1 or the goal of unification and certainty in international sales contracts 12 2 to decide which rule is preferable.
cover than for breaching sellers. Yorio, supra note 108, at 1384-85. Both Schwartz and Ulen
have shown, however, that sellers and buyers generally have similar cover costs and that no
evidence exists of any systematic difference between them. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at
286-89; Ulen, supra note 46, at 385-89.
114. In some cases the advantages of an alternative sale, for example, may be so great that the
seller will willingly pay whatever damages the buyer claims. Yet there is an incentive in this
situation for the buyer to inflate his damages and for the seller to contest. In such cases litigation
over damages is likely.
115. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 276-78.
116. Professor Macneil suggests that the costs of empirical investigations necessary to weigh
transaction costs would far outweigh the benefits of such investigations and therefore that it
might "be far better to ignore all the sophistication in favor of historical or more intuitive
solutions." Macneil, supra note 105, at 954 n.28, 957. He then suggests some consideration of
relational and cooperative norms relevant to this issue. Id. at 961-69. Under the Sales
Convention, the goal of uniformity strongly favors the routine use of specific performance in
international sales contracts.
117. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 278-92.
118. Ulen, supra note 46, at 366-96.
119. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 305.
120. See Linzer, supra note 105, at 112-13, 138-39.
121. Cf Macneil, supra note 105, at 968-69.
122. See Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 7.

Requiring Performance in International Sales
This review of the debate over the economic efficiency of specific
performance suggests that it is most efficient to allow the non-breaching party to choose between specific performance and damages, or, at
least, that this approach will entail only minimal efficiency losses.
This indicates in turn that the general approach of the Convention,
allowing an aggrieved party to choose between the right to performance and damages, is a wise one and that uniformity and certainty
need not be sacrificed merely to preserve a rule favoring substitutional
damages. This conclusion in turn suggests that courts should interpret
article 28 whenever possible to preserve an aggrieved party's right to
require performance. The following section proposes an interpretation
of article 28 with this object in mind.
2. Application of Article 28 Toward an InternationalInterpretation
As finally adopted, article 28 provides that "a court is not bound to
enter a judgment of specific performance unless the court would do so
under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed
by the Convention." Any interpretation of this provision must bear in
mind the limited purposes of article 28 discussed in the preceding section. It is also necessary to address three specific questions regarding
application of this provision. First, what kinds of orders does the
phrase "judgment of specific performance" cover? Second, what does
the reference to "its own law" mean? And third, does article 28
require a court to treat international contracts as identical to domestic
contracts?
a

"A Judgment of Specific Performance"

Under Anglo-American law, specific performance refers to a judicial order requiring the performance of a party's contractual obligations. 12 3 Since a judgment for specific performance takes the form of a
direct order to one party, its violation is punishable by contempt of
12 4

court.

The content of an order for specific performance under AngloAmerican law can be quite broad, since a court can order performance
125
of any act that a party can legally incur an obligation to perform.
123. Cf. E.A. FAnNSWORTH, supra note 21, at 823-24.
124. Penalties for violation of an order of specific performance may include fines or
imprisonment for contempt. See E. MuRPHY & R. SPEIDEL, STUDIs IN CoNTRACr LAW 1123
(3d ed. 1984).
125. See E.A. FARNswoRTH, supra note 21, at 823. Traditional Anglo-American law has
refused specific performance of personal service contracts and of contracts that offend public

policy. Id at 835-38.
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In addition, an order for specific performance can include the payment
of money to compensate for delay or other defects in the eventual performance.1 26 However, for largely historical reasons, Anglo-American
law does not consider a judgment against the buyer for payment of the
contract price to be an order for specific performance. 12 7 A judgment
for the price is considered instead to be one form of damages. It is not
enforceable by contempt and it does not have any other attributes of
an order for specific performance.12 8 Similarly, courts in common law
countries do not normally order a breaching seller to repair defective
goods. This form of specific relief simply has not been recognized as a
traditional form of specific performance. 129
What, then, is the meaning of "specific performance" under article
28 of the Sales Convention? The Convention and the Secretariat's
Commentary make it clear that it does include an order requiring the
seller to deliver goods pursuant to article 46.130 Does it include, in
addition, an order requiring a buyer to pay the contract price under
article 62 or requiring a seller to make repairs under article 46(3)?
First, the term "specific performance" in article 28 need not refer to
the definition of "specific performance" in the various national legal
systems.T3 1 One should assume that the words of the Convention
themselves have meaning. 132 The Convention is intended to establish
126. See id. at 825; cf. U.C.C. § 2-716 (1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 358(3) (1981).
127. See J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 348, at 357; Farnsworth, supra note 18, at 249-50.
128. In addition to enforcement by contempt, the most distinguishing aspects of an action for
specific performance are that there is no right to a jury trial, see D. DOBaS, REMEDIES 796
(1973), and the various equitable defenses, such as unclean hands, public policy, laches, and the
like, apply. See H. MCCLINTOCK, HANDBOOK OF THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUrrY 62, 129, 212
(1948).
129. See Summary Records of the First Committee (19th mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.97/C. I/
SR. 19 (1980) [hereinafter Summary Records (19th mtg.)], reprinted in OFFICIAL RECORDS, supra
note 1, at 334, 335-36 (Statements of Mrs. Kamarul (Australia), Mr. Date-Bah (Ghana), Mr.
Farnsworth (United States of America)).
130. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 46(1), (2). The Commentary to article 46 explicitly
refers to article 28. See 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supranote 35, art. 42, para. 9
(article 28 was then numbered 26).
131. The detailed meanings of "specific performance" in English are not necessarily
paralleled in each of the six official languages of the Convention. The French version of article
28 refers to "l'exhcution en nature"; the Spanish version refers to "cumplimiento especilico."
The Russian, Chinese, and Arabic versions reflect similar variety. See United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 97/18,
Annex I (1980) (French, Spanish, Russian, Chinese, and Arabic versions). In each of these
languages, the words used may overlap technical terms used in domestic law.
132. Cf J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 85, at 113 (paragraph (1) of article 7 "emphasizes that
this law must be interpreted with sensitive regard for its special character and purpose"). For
further discussion of this point, see infra note 178 and accompanying text.
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uniformity and certainty in the law governing international sales. In
order to achieve this goal, the Convention should be interpreted in its
own right, in light of its underlying purposes and drafting history.13 3
Does "specific performance" include an order requiring the buyer to
pay the price? The drafting history strongly suggests that the term
specific performance refers to any order requiring the performance of
contractual obligations, whether of the seller or the buyer. 134 The Secretariat's Commentary to article 28 mentions both articles 46, regarding the buyer's right to performance, and 62, regarding the seller's
right to payment of the price. 135 In addition, the Commentary to article 62 specifically notes that the seller's right to payment would be
subject to article 28.136 Article 28, then, should be interpreted to
include any order requiring full performance by the seller or the buyer
under articles 46 and 62.137
An order requiring the seller to repair defective goods under article
46(3) is more difficult to evaluate. 131 The Commentary does not suggest any distinction between the various subsections of article 46 in its
reference to article 28, and the drafting history nowhere directly
addresses the question whether such an order for repairs would be
covered by article 28. Considering the purposes of article 28, one
could conclude that the objections to an order requiring a seller to
deliver contract goods or substitute goods should apply as well to an
In all of these cases the
order requiring the seller to make repairs. 139
court is coercing performance by the seller.
Yet characterizing an order to repair as an order for specific performance has one troubling consequence. If the right to repair under
article 46(3) is enforceable only if "the court would do so under its
133. See generally J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, §§ 85-93, at 113-23 (discussing the
interpretation of the Convention in light of its underlying principles and its legislative history).

134. See Report of the Secretary-Generai Obligations of the Seller in InternationalSale of
Goods; Consolidationof Work Done by the Working Group on the InternationalSale of Goods and
Suggested Solutions for Unresolved Problems, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.16 (1972)

[hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General],reprintedin [1973] 4 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L
TRADE L. 36, 52, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1973 (noting that the preservation of domestic
law in the Uniform Law on International Sales (1964) applied to the right to payment of the

price); J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 348, at 357-58.
135. 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 26. The final article 46
was then article 42; the final article 62 was then article 58.
136. Id.art. 58.
137. J.HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 348, at 357-58 (concluding that article 28 does apply to an
action for the price under article 62); Ziegel, supra note 18, at 9-31. Contra Farnsworth, supra
note 18, at 249.
138. Article 46(3) is quoted supra note 56.
139. See supra notes 84-122 and accompanying text for discussion of the rationale of article
28.
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own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not governed by this
Convention," then this remedy will be severely limited because many
legal systems do not recognize a separate remedy of required repair."
The drafters of the Convention adopted the right to repair as an alternative to requiring the delivery of substitute goods where the delivery
of substitute goods clearly would be wasteful. 141 If an order to repair
is characterized as an order to perform to which article 28 applies, this
innovative remedy could rarely be invoked because most courts could
disregard it as inconsistent with domestic law. This would significantly limit the effect of article 46(3).142
There is no easy solution to this problem. The approach most consistent with the language and purpose both of article 28 and article 46
would be to say that an order of repair is subject to article 28, but that
always under article 28 courts have the discretion to vary from domestic law in order to give effect to the international character of the contract and the need for uniformity in the law governing international
sales. Under this approach, a court should exercise its discretion
140. Cf Summary Records (19th mtg.), supra note 129, at 334, 335-36 (several delegates
commented that the right to repair was unknown in their domestic laws).
141. The Uniform Law on International Sales (1964) included a right to repair with respect to
goods produced or manufactured by the seller. See Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on
the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, Annex (Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods), 834 U.N.T.S. 109, 141 (art. 42). However, this was not included in the draft of article
46 recommended by UNCITRAL. See Text ofDraft Convention, supra note 88, art. 42, at 5, 38.
An amendment to article 46 incorporating a right to repair was introduced jointly by the Federal
Republic of Germany, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Report of the First Committee, supra note
78, at 82, 112-13. During debate on the amendment, some delegates noted that the right to
repair was necessary to protect the buyer where delivered goods were defective but the defects
did not constitute a fundamental breach. See Summary Records (19th mtg.), supra note 129, at
334, 335-36. The range of opinion expressed in the debate was quite broad. Some delegates
objected to the fundamental breach limitation on the right to require substitute goods; some
thought that even the right to repair should be severely limited. The final version of article 46
emerged as a compromise designed to both preserve the fundamental breach limitation in
subsection (2) and to give the buyer a right to require repairs by the seller except where such
repairs would be technically unfeasible or economically unreasonable.
For an explanation of the fundamental breach limitation in subsection (2), see 1978
Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 42, para. 12:
If the goods which have been delivered do not conform to the contract, the buyer may
want the seller to deliver substitute goods which do conform. However, it could be expected
that the costs to the seller of shipping a second lot of goods to the buyer and of disposing of
the non-conforming goods already delivered might be considerably greater than the buyer's
loss from having non-conforming goods. Therefore, paragraph (2) provides that the buyer
can "require delivery of substitute goods only if the lack of conformity constitutes a
fundamental breach ...."
142. Cf P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 39, at 63, 76 n.293 ("Article 28 does not justify the
rejection of a claim for repair merely because it is unknown as a remedy under domestic law.").
This observation is consistent with the suggestion that courts should exercise their discretion to
treat international sales contracts differently than they would treat domestic contracts.
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under article 28 to order specific performance, sometimes in the form
even if it would not do so in a dispute involving a
of an order to repair,
143
domestic contract.
b. "'ItsOwn Law"
Article 28 does not bind a court to order specific performance unless
it would do so under "its own law." This provision was clearly
intended to refer to the "lex fori"; however, it is not clear whether a
court should also look to the forum's choice of law rules in considering
was raised at
whether to grant specific performance. 144 This question145
the Vienna Conference, but no clear answer was given.
The question is significant. In some legal systems, the issue of
whether to grant specific performance is considered to be substantive
and thus is governed by the proper law of the contract, as determined
by the rules of private international law. 141 Other legal systems consider the issue to be procedural and hence governed solely by the law
of the forum. If article 28 refers to the forum's choice of law rules as
well as to its contract law, then the issue of specific performance may
be governed by a law which is inconsistent with the forum's own contract law. At the least, the practical effect of such an interpretation
would be to resurrect difficult choice of law issues in many international contract disputes, and to make enforcement of the right to performance recognized by the Convention even more uncertain.
The rationale of article 28 clearly suggests that the issue of specific
performance should be governed by the forum's domestic contract
law, without reference to the choice of law rules of private international law. The debates over article 28 centered first on the problem of
143. For further discussion of the court's discretion to vary from domestic law under article
28, see infra notes 149-59 and accompanying text.
144. References to article 28 throughout the drafting history simply mention the "lex fori" of
the court. See, e-g., Report of the Secretary-General,supra note 134, at 36, 53 (referring to "the
procedural rules of the forum"); Analysis of Comments and Proposals Relating to Articles 18-55
of the Uniform Law on InternationalSale of Goods (ULIS): Note by the Secretary-General,U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.2/WP.10 (1971) ("lex fori"), reprinted in [1972] 3 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON
INT'L TRADE L. 54, 60, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SERA/1972. But cf Progress Report of the
Working Group on the InternationalSale ofGoods on the Work ofIts Fifth Session, U.N. Doc. A/

CN.9/87 (1974) ("One observer held that the phrase 'similar contracts of sale not governed by
the Uniform Law' pointed to domestic contracts. He,therefore; suggested that the commentary
should contain a clear statement to this effect."), reprinted in [1974] 5 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON
INT'L TRADE L. 29, 33, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1974.
145. Summary Records (13th mtg.), supra note 90, at 302, 305.
146. See J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 195, at 224 n.4; cf DIcEY AND MORRIS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS 1175-78 (J. Morris 10th ed. 1980) (discussing the characterization of rules
as procedural or substantive).
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judicial systems that have no mechanism for injunctive orders and second on the desire for deference to those legal systems that consider
specific performance as an exceptional remedy.' 4 7 For both of these
goals, the focus is on the normal practice of the court applying domestic law. It would be anomalous to say that the Convention will not
directly require such legal systems to grant specific performance, but
that it will require them to apply the law of some other legal system
that may require specific performance. Conversely, if a legal system
stands ready to order specific performance, it should not be prevented
from doing so by choice of law rules which likely do not take into
account the policies underlying the article 28 compromise. Article 28,
then, should be interpreted as referring to the domestic law of the
forum court and not to its choice of law rules. 4 8
c. JudicialDiscretion Under Article 28
Article 28 provides that a court "is not bound" to order specific
performance in a dispute governed by the Convention unless it would
do so "under its own law in respect of similar contracts of sale not
governed by the Convention." If the domestic law of the forum court
would require an order of specific performance in a similar contract of
sale, the court must order specific performance if the party otherwise
has a right to performance under the Convention.14 9 If, on the other
hand, the domestic law of the forum court does not require an order of
specific performance, does the court nevertheless have discretion
under the Convention to enforce the right to performance? The best
interpretation of article 28 would hold that it does. 5 °
The negative phrasing in article 28 is consistent with its purpose.
This provision was adopted in order to avoid forcing national courts to
issue orders that either were not authorized or were considered unwise
under domestic law. The drafting history does not disclose any reason
to require adherence to domestic rules on specific performance. In
short, article 28 does not require a court to apply its law to a contract
governed by the Convention; it simply allows the court to follow
domestic law if it so chooses.
147. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
148. See J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 195, at 224; P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 39, at 63.
149. The Convention's vahous limitations on the right to performance would apply even if
the court's domestic law would grant specific performance. J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 195, at
225.
150. This view is shared by most commentators who have addressed the issue. See. eg.,
Date-Bah, supra note 18, at 62; Gonzalez, supranote 18, at 97; cf. Bergsten, supra note 99, at 13
(describing article 28 as the general preservation of discretion). But see J. HONNOLD, supra note
4, § 195, at 225.
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Article 7 further supports the interpretation of article 28 as discretionary."' Article 7 requires that the Convention be interpreted consistently with its international character and with the need to promote
uniformity in its application. An interpretation of article 28 allowing
a court to give effect to the right to performance recognized in articles
46 and 62 without regard to domestic law furthers these principles.
Most civil law courts will readily enforce the right to performance
under the Convention's remedial provisions; certainly courts in common law nations should be encouraged to do the same.
Interpreting article 28 as discretionary is also consistent with the
broad discretion given to courts under Anglo-American common law
to determine when specific performance of a contract should be
ordered.' 5 2 Section 2-716 of the Uniform Commercial Code, for
example, allows the court to order specific performance where the
goods are unique or "in other proper circumstances."' 53 In exercising
that discretion, a court appropriately considers all of the circumstances of the case, including its international character.' 4 Three factors suggest that even under American law, courts should order
specific performance more readily in disputes governed by the Sales
Convention than they would in other contexts.
First, the difficulties of cover and resale are often aggravated in
international transactions. Even though alternative suppliers exist, for
example, it may be difficult for a buyer in one country to locate a new
seller in another country and to negotiate a contract with him. Similarly, a seller of goods with an international market often will have
added difficulty locating and contracting with a new buyer. This suggests that even under American law, the ability to cover or resell in
international contracts should be carefully evaluated. While fungible
151. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 7, quoted supra note 61.
152. See generally E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, at 826-38 (analyzing factors which
may influence a court in the exercise of its discretion to order specific performance).
153. U.C.C. § 2-716 (1978). This provision effectively gives significant discretion to the
courts to determine "appropriate circumstances" for specific relief. See J. WHrra & R.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 238 (2d ed. 1980) (noting that "the perimeters of
uniqueness vis a vis 'other proper circumstances' remain undefined"); see also U.C.C. § 2-716
comment 1 (1978) ("without intending to impair in any way the exercise of the court's sound
discretion in the matter, this Article seeks to further a more liberal attitude than some courts
have shown in connection with the specific performance of contracts of sale."). For an example

of an increasingly common broad interpretation of "other proper circumstance," see Laclede Gas
Co. v. Amoco Oil Co., 522 F.2d 33 (8th Cir. 1975).
154. Cf Ziegel, supra note 18, at 9-11:
[W]hen article 28 invites a tribunal to consider whether a "similar" contract would be
specifically enforceable under its own law, presumably it is not the contract alone but all the
surrounding circumstances, including the subject matter of the contract and the identity of
the parties, that the court is entitled to take into consideration.
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goods may be readily covered or resold
in a domestic market, this may
55
not be true in international trade.
Second, the expectations of the parties to an international contract
may be quite different than those to a domestic contract. The civil law
system, which generally recognizes and enforces a right to performance, has influenced much of the world.' 5 6 Although the expectations
of the parties are not determinative in American law governing specific
performance, still a court may consider them in exercising its discretion to order specific relief.'5 7 If one of the parties is from a jurisdiction influenced by the civil law, and the other deals regularly within a
civil law system or under the Sales Convention, an American court
should more readily enforce the Convention's right to performance58as
consistent with the parties' general, albeit unspoken, expectation.
Finally, an American court may recognize, in the exercise of its discretion to order specific performance, the need to promote uniformity
in the application of the Sales Convention. The Convention's general
remedial provisions give the aggrieved party the choice whether to
enforce a right to performance or to seek damages. This approach
appears to be economically efficient, and it accords with notions of
fairness and justice shared by most of the world. Courts in most civil
law nations and in many other states likely will give effect to this
approach and will allow the aggrieved party to choose specific performance so long as this is not unduly burdensome to the other side.
If so, American courts will significantly further the goal of uniformity
by granting specific performance when the aggrieved party requests it.
By thus reducing the uncertainty over the right to performance, the
courts will encourage the parties to an international contract to settle
their claims informally. Uniformity of result also will help prevent the
costs and delay resulting from forum-shopping. Finally, this will
encourage development of an international jurisprudence in the application of the Sales Convention.' 59
155. See 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 42, para. 2, quoted
supra note 42.
156. See generally Treitel, supra note 22, at 16-7 to 16-39 (surveying the right to performance
in numerous legal systems).

157. Cf E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, at 831-32 (discussing the relevance of parties'
agreements regarding specific performance).
158. Deference to the parties' expectations, both spoken and unspoken, is consistent with the
Convention's commitment to freedom of contract. See Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 6
(parties may waive or vary provisions of the Convention by agreement); id. art. 8 (statements,
conduct, and "all relevant circumstances of the case" are relevant in determining the parties'
intent and understanding). See generally J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 2, at 47-48 (emphasizing

the Convention's commitment to the primacy of the parties' agreement).
159. See infra notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
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II. AGREEMENTS REGARDING SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE
In an international transaction governed by the Sales Convention,
article 28 will directly affect the post-breach strategy of an aggrieved
buyer or seller who prefers to pursue full performance. 1" Because of
article 28, the aggrieved party will be unable to predict with any
degree of certainty whether his right to performance will be enforced
by court order because the case may be heard in a jurisdiction where
the domestic law restricts specific performance. Yet cover may be
imperfect, and a damage award may be inadequate or unenforceable.' 6 1 The aggrieved party may nonetheless be compelled to accept a
less than satisfactory alternative transaction rather than risk the possibility of greater loss if a court refuses to order specific performance. In

this way article 28 is not a balanced compromise; it effectively negates
the right to performance.
Contracting parties may avoid the post-breach uncertainty created
by article 28 by specifying in the contract that specific performance
will or will not be available in the event of a breach. Although such
terms have been relatively rare in the past, still under the Convention
such a term may be advisable.16 2 The difficult question is whether
such a term will be effective to assure or preclude an order of specific
performance in the event of a breach.
160. Some commentators have suggested that because the parties will choose resale or cover
in many contract disputes, the problems created by article 28 will not be significant in practice.
See, eg., J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 199, at 228 (suggesting that even if article 28 was
unfortunate, still it may have been necessary to allow for unification on matters of greater
practical concern); Reinhart, Development of a Law for the InternationalSale of Goods, 14
CuMB. L. REV. 89, 98-99 (1984). This does not deny, however, that article 28 will cause
significant uncertainty and unfairness in those cases where an aggrieved party would prefer full
performance.
161. See supra notes 108-12 and accompanying text.
162. The Section on International Law and Practice of the American Bar Association noted
the possibility of an express contract term regarding specific performance in its report to the
Association recommending support for ratification of the Sales Convention. American Bar
Association Report to the House of Delegates"Section on InternationalLaw and Practice, 18 IN'L
LAW. 39, 46 (1984) [hereinafter American BarAssociation Report].
An international sales contract may also include a term regarding specific performance by
incorporation of a recognized trade usage on the issue. Article 9(1) provides that "[tihe parties
are bound by any usage to which they have agreed and by any practices which they have
established between themselves." Sales Convention, supranote 1, art. 9(1). The practice in some
trades may require a buyer to cover if a seller gives notice that he will not deliver, or it may
require a seller to resell the goods if the buyer refuses to take delivery. Under the Convention,
such a usage would be part of a contract between members of the trade, and would operate as the
equivalent of an express term.
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In general, the Convention embraces the principle of freedom of
1 63
contract, and article 6 expressly recognizes contractual choice.
Three questions arise, however, regarding the effectiveness of a contractual term governing specific performance. First, if the contract
provides that specific performance should be granted in the event of a
breach, can this term overcome article 28? Second, if tjie Convention
does give effect to such a contract term, will the term nevertheless be
subject to domestic rules denying enforcement to contract clauses
regarding specific performance? In particular, does article 4 preserve
such a domestic rule as a rule of validity? Third, what if a state has no
recognized mechanism for specific performance or injunctive relief
under its domestic law? Is the court of such a state required to
develop a mechanism for injunctive orders if the parties agree to a
clause requiring specific performance?
A.

Contractual Waiver of Article 28

Article 28 provides that "a court is not bound to enter a judgment
for specific performance unless the court would do so under its own
law in respect of similar contracts of sale.""
Enforcement of a contract term providing for specific performance would require that the
court order specific performance even if the court would not normally
do so in similar contracts. The contract term, then, attempts to waive,
or change, the application of article 28.165
Article 6, the "freedom of contract" provision, specifies that contracting parties may "derogate from or vary the effect of any of [the
Convention's] provisions. ' The Secretariat's Commentary to this
section describes the Convention as "non-mandatory" and makes clear
the goal of giving autonomy to contracting parties to determine their
own governing rules.1 67 Arguably, however, article 28 differs from
most of the Convention's provisions because it deals directly with a
court's power and discretion to grant injunctive relief. In this way,
163. Article 6 provides: "The parties may exclude the application of this Convention or,
subject to article 12, derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions." Sales Convention,
supra note 1, art. 6.
164. Id. art. 28.
165. Similarly, a clause prohibiting specific performance would waive article 28 in the other
direction. Article 28 provides that a court "is not bound to enter a judgment for specific
performance unless the court would do so under its own law." Id. (emphasis added). Under
such a contract term the court would not be bound at all. A clause prohibiting specific
performance would also have the effect of waiving article 46.
166. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 6. Article 6 expressly exempts article 12, on
domestic statutes of frauds, from the parties' power to waive provisions.
167. See 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 5, para. 1.
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article 28 is more like article 12, regarding domestic statutes of
frauds.168 Article 12 is expressly exempted from the contractual
waiver power in article 6. The parties cannot agree to be bound by an
oral modification if any party has its principal place of business in a
Contracting State that has preserved its own statute of frauds under
article 96. Similarly, one may argue, the parties cannot require specific performance when the court would not otherwise grant it under

article 28.
On balance, however, article 6 should be interpreted to permit
waiver of article 28. First, only article 12, not article 28, is expressly
exempted from article 6. Furthermore, the Convention's drafters reasonably might have concluded that the domestic policies supporting a
statute of frauds are more significant than those protecting a court's
169
discretion to deny specific performance.

168. Article 12 provides as follows:
Any provision of article 11, article 29 or Part II of this Convention that allows a contract
of sale or its modification or termination by agreement or any offer, acceptance or other
indication of intention to be made in any form other than in writing does not apply where
any party has his place of business in a Contracting State which has made a declaration
under article 96 of this Convention. The parties may not derogate from or vary the effect of
this article.
Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 12.
169. The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics argued in particular that
the preservation of domestic law requiring written documentation in international sales contracts
was critical to protect established practices within the Soviet government for the approval and
completion of foreign trade agreements. See J. HONNOLD, supranote 4, § 128, at 155. Although
a majority of the members of UNCITRAL clearly would have opposed a general writing
requirement as contrary to accepted international trade practice and there was significant initial
opposition to permitting Contracting States to make a declaration preserving domestic law on
this issue, the UNCITRAL delegates finally agreed to allow such declarations. To trace this
development, see Analysis of Comments and ProposalsRelating to Articles 1-17 of the Uniform
Law on the InternationalSale of Goods (ULIS): Note by the Secretary-General,U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/WG.2/WP.11 (1971), reprinted in [1972] 3 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L. 69,
74-76, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1972; Text of Comments andProposalsof Representatives on
the Revised Text of a Uniform Law on InternationalSale of Goods as Approved or Deferredfor
FurtherConsideration by the Working Group at Its First Five Sessions, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/100,
Annex 11 (1975), reprintedin [1975] 6 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INt'L TRADE L. 70,78, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/SER.A/1975; Report of the Secretary-General (Addendum): Pending Questions with
Respect to the Revised Text of a Uniform Law on the InternationalSale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/
CN.9/100, Annex IV (1975), reprinted in [1975] 6 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L. 110,
111-12, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1975; Report of the Secretary-Genera Analysis of
Comments by Governments and International Organizations on the Draft Convention on the
InternationalSale of Goods asAdopted by the Working Group on the InternationalSale of Goods,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/126 (1977), reprinted in [1977] 8 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L.
142, 149-50, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.
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ContractualProvision as an Issue of Validity

On a different tack, however, a court may refuse to give effect to a
clause requiring specific performance, not under article 28, but rather
under its own domestic law, preserved by article 4. Article 4 states
that the Convention "is not concerned with.., the validity of a contract or of any of its provisions." 0 Under this provision, can a court
enforce a domestic rule invalidating contract terms mandating specific
performance?' 7 1 Normally, if the contract is covered by the Convention,1 72 then domestic rules of contract law do not apply; the Convention provisions govern issues of formation, interpretation, excuse, and
remedies. Moreover, even if the Convention does not expressly
address an issue, the Convention directs courts to look to the general
principles underlying the Convention to develop an appropriate analysis. 173 Article 4, however, establishes two exemptions from this general approach. 1 74 First, the Convention does not cover the effect of a
contract on property rights in the goods sold. Second, the Convention
does not govern the validity of the contract or any of its provisions.
Is a domestic rule that denies the effectiveness of a contract term
regarding specific performance a rule of "validity"? The Convention
does not define the term "validity."' 7 5 In the absence of an express
170. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 4.
171. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 106, at 371 (noting the general rule in United States law
that a contract term regarding specific performance need not be enforced by the court); Macneil,
Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 520-23 (1962); cf D. DOBBS,
supra note 128, at 825 (reviewing the arguments on both sides).
Although some courts in the United States generally have denied effect to contract terms
regarding specific performance, still they have occasionally given weight to the parties'
characterization of uniqueness. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, at 831-32 (noting that
courts may take notice of facts recited in the contract in evaluating a claim for specific
performance); compare Duval & Co. v. Malcom, 233 Ga. 784, 214 S.E.2d 356 (1975) (specific
performance of a contract for the sale of cotton denied), with R.L. Kimsey Cotton Co. v.
Ferguson, 233 Ga. 962, 214 S.E.2d 360 (1975) (same court, order of specific performance granted
where the parties had stipulated prior to trial that the cotton was "unique").
172. For coverage of the Convention, see article 1(I), quoted supra note 2.
173. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(2). It is only in the absence of such principles that
the court may look to the domestic law for guidance. Id.
174. Article 4 provides as follows:
This Convention governs only the formation of the contract of sale and the rights and
obligations of the seller and the buyer arising from such a contract. In particular, except as
otherwise expressly provided in this Convention, it is not concerned with:
(a) the validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage;
(b) the effect which the contract may have on the property in the goods sold.
Id. art. 4.
175. The language in article 4 echoes article 8 of the 1964 Uniform Law on the International
Sale of Goods. The Uniform Law was similarly silent on the meaning of this term. See
Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, Annex
(Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods), 834 U.N.T.S. 109, 125 (art. 8).
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definition, at least one commentator has argued that the definition of
validity should be found in the domestic law of the appropriate jurisdiction under private international law.' 7 6 This conclusion is troubling
because it holds that a term of the Convention, a uniform law, must
have multiple meanings. This interpretation also would permit each
national legal system to overcome the Convention's general preemption of domestic law by defining the term "validity" as broadly as it
deemed appropriate. Merely by characterizing an aspect of contract
law as a rule of validity, each jurisdiction could subject contracts for
the international sale of goods to numerous rules of substantive
domestic commercial law. This clearly would undermine the Convention's goal of uniformity. 177
Defining validity by reference to domestic law too easily dismisses
the possibility of a Convention-based definition. First, such a definition is suggested as a basic tenet of statutory construction. The term is
used in the Convention and therefore it must have some meaning
intrinsic to the Convention. Second, article 7(1) mandates such a definition: "In the interpretation of this Convention, regard is to be had to
its international character and to the need to promote uniformity in its
78
application and the observance of good faith in international trade."'
Applying article 7(1), the term "validity" in article 4 can be defined
consistently with the principles of internationalism, uniformity, and
good faith. First, the language of article 4 suggests that the term does
not include any issue expressly addressed by the Convention. The
exemption for rules of validity is phrased as a description of the Convention: "[The Convention] is not concerned with... the validity of
the contract or any of its provisions."' 1 9 Any issue that is expressly
addressed by the Convention, then, should not be characterized as an
176. Note, Disclaimers of Implied Warranties: The 1980 United Nations Convention on
Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 863, 874 (1985).
177. There are vast differences in different legal systems' concepts of validity and in their use
of the word "validity" and its various translations. In French law, for example, some issues
relating to non-conformity of goods are treated as issues of validity. See Nicholas, supra note 64,
at 231-32; cf J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, § 234, at 258-59 (arguing that the warranty provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code should not be treated as rules of validity merely because they
deny legal effect to, or render "invalid," some contract provisions). But cf Ziegel, supra note 18,
at 9-38 (observing that courts might interpret article 4 to include national rules on disclaimers of
warranties). The official language versions of article 4 refer to "a validez" (Spanish) and "la
validite" (French). The Arabic, Chinese, and Russian versions obviously are less closely related.
178. Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(1). Article 7(2), which permits limited reference
to domestic law, provides that domestic law should apply only "in the absence" of general
principles underlying the Convention. Id. art. 7(2), quoted supranote 61. In this case the general
principles of internationalism and uniformity provide guidance for a Convention-based definition
of validity.
179. Id. art. 4, quoted supra note 174.
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issue of "validity" under article 4, because that would contradict the
quoted language.18 The Secretariat's Commentary to article 4 supports this conclusion:
Although there are no provisions in this Convention which expressly
govern the validity of the contract or of any usage, some provisions may
provide a rule which would contradict the rules on validity of contracts
in a national legal
system. In case of conflict the rule in this Convention
81
would apply. 1
The Secretariat then suggests the possibility of such a conflict with
article 11,182 which provides that a contract need not be in writing.
Even though an oral contract is considered to be "invalid" under some
legal systems, this is not a rule of validity within the meaning of article
4.183

In addition, the drafting history of article 4 suggests that the UNCITRAL representatives considered issues of validity to include only
issues such as fraud, duress, unconscionability, and incapacity. 8t 4 The
UNCITRAL delegates may have chosen to defer to domestic law on
these matters because they involve very significant issues of public policy and the protection of parties. Regard for the principles of internationalism and uniformity can be achieved by a definition of validity
that gives deference to very important public policies in the various
contracting states, but at the same time limits the category of validity
issues to those matters that involve very significant public policies and
does not include the vast array of detailed regulatory provisions that
exist throughout the world. Domestic rules against contract terms
regarding specific performance do not involve considerations of the
same magnitude as those underlying issues such as fraud, duress, and
incapacity. In the common law countries, such rules reflect vague
notions regarding the traditional jurisdictional limits of common law
180. But cf Gonzalez, supra note 18, at 82 (asserting that the text of article 4 itself does not
address the question of conflicts between the Convention and national rules of validity).
181. 1978 Commentary on the Draft Convention, supra note 35, art. 4, para. 2.
182. Id. para. 3 (article I1 was then numbered 10).
183. Cf P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 39, at 33 & n.83b (arguing that a domestic rule
invalidating contract terms limiting damages to foreseeable loss would not be preserved under
article 4 because it would conflict with the foreseeability principle underlying articles 74-76).
184. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General Formation and Validity of Contractsfor the
InternationalSale of Goods, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/128, Annex 11 (1977) (referring to the draft of a
Law for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to the Validity of Contracts of International
Sale of Goods, prepared by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT), which includes provisions on mistake, fraud, duress, and impossibility of
performance at the time of contracting as well as provisions relating to the interpretation of the
acts of the parties), reprinted in [1977] 8 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L. 90, 92, U.N.

Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977.

646

Requiring Performance in International Sales
courts and courts of equity."8 5 A national rule denying enforcement to
such terms should not be treated as a rule of validity within the meaning of article 4.
An express contract term concerning specific performance should be
enforceable, then, under the general provisions of articles 30 and 53.186
These provisions require the parties to comply with their obligations
under the contract. If the contract provides that specific performance
is not appropriate in the event of a breach, then the court should limit
recovery to damages, even if it otherwise would have entered injunctive relief. Similarly, if the contract indicates that specific performance should be granted, then the court should do so, in order to carry
out the agreement of the parties.
C. JurisdictionsLacking Injunctive Mechanisms
But what if the dispute comes to trial in a jurisdiction that does not
have some mechanism for injunctive relief? By ratifying the Convention, such a nation adopts the Convention as a part of its national law,
but does this obligate it to develop a mechanism for specific relief? If
the Convention requires enforcement of a contract term requiring specific performance, can the court refuse to issue such an order merely
because injunctive relief is not a traditional part of its law? Difficult as
this might appear in practice, the answer should be no. A court cannot refuse to order injunctive relief in this circumstance. Following
ratification, the Convention governs disputes coming within its purview. As discussed above, the Convention requires enforcement of a
contract term unless it comes within one of the limited exceptions in
article 4.187 Because an agreement regarding specific performance is
not within those exceptions, the court is required to enforce it.
This answer of course has practical problems. In some nations, an
order of specific performance may lack any enforcement mechanism.
This problem clearly is not covered by the Convention, and an
aggrieved party would have no recourse beyond the remedies available
in domestic law."' 8 Yet this situation will be very rare. Only a very
185. See E.A. FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, at 831-32.
186. Article 30 provides: "The seller must deliver the goods, hand over any documents
relating to them and transfer the property in the goods, as required by the contract and this
Convention." Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 30.
Article 53 provides: "The buyer must pay the price for the goods and take delivery of them as
required by the contract and this Convention." Id. art. 53.
187. See supra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
188. Cf Report of the Working Group, supra note 88, at 49, 54 ("[The current text of article
28] does not speak of the enforcement of a judgment for specific performance, a subject thought
not to be appropriate for a Convention on the law of sales.").
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few legal systems lack some form of injunctive mechanism, and these
can be easily avoided by the aggrieved party through the choice of
18 9
forum.
An agreement regarding specific performance, then, should be given
effect under the Sales Convention. 190 By including a term either
requiring or prohibiting specific performance in the event of a breach,
contracting parties should be able to avoid the uncertainty and confusion in post-breach negotiations caused by article 28 and to avoid the
costs and delay of forum-shopping.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Sales Convention now governs disputes arising from contracts
between citizens or organizations of the United States and citizens or
organizations of other Contracting States.1 9 1 As of June 14, 1988, the
Convention has been ratified by sixteen nations, 192 and many other
nations will ratify within the next few years. Courts throughout the
world will soon be called upon to interpret and apply the provisions of
the Convention. Courts and lawyers must become familiar with the
Convention and with the appropriate methods of its interpretation.
Many scholars have already written about the Convention, and an
international body of commentary is developing. 93 As this discussion
189. Unlike the problems of forum-shopping that would result from a broad application of
article 28, here the choice of forum would be significant only to avoid those few jurisdictions that
have no mechanism for enforcement of an order of performance in those cases where the contract
specifies specific performance as the agreed remedy. This does not present serious problems of
forum-shopping.
190. Cf American Bar Association Report, supra note 162, at 45-46 (recommending
consideration of such a contract term); Ulen, supra note 46, at 355 (arguing that a contract term
favoring specific performance should be enforceable under United States law, so long as the
parties have legitimately agreed to it).
191. See Sales Convention, supra note 1, art. 1, quoted supra note 2.
192. See supra note 2.
193. Commentary on the Convention available in English now includes two treatises, J.
HONNOLD, supra note 4; P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 39; three major collections of essays,
INTERNATIONAL SALES: THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (1984); INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS: DUBROVNIK
LECTURES (1986); PROBLEMS OF UNIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW (1980)
(formerly in 7 DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD; copy on file in Washington Law

Review offices); two major law review symposia, Symposium on InternationalSale of Goods
Convention, 18 INT'L LAW. 3 (1984); Unification of InternationalTrade Law: UNCITRAL's First
Decade, 27 AM. J. COMp. L. 201 (1979); and numerous law review articles and student
comments. In addition to the articles cited elsewhere in this article, see, e.g., Dore, Choice of
Law Under the InternationalSales Convention:A U.S. Perspective,77 AM. J. INT'L L. 521 (1983);
Dore & DeFranco, A Comparison of the Non-Substantive Provisions of the UNCITRAL
Convention on the InternationalSale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code, 23 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 49 (1982); Farnsworth, Developing InternationalTrade Law, 9 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 461
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grows, it is crucial that courts and scholars focus on the appropriate
methodology for interpreting the Convention and that they seek uniformity and internationalism in its application.1 9 a
The Convention was drafted with a sense of discovery and compromise: UNCITRAL delegates focused on specific factual situations in
an attempt to recognize and articulate common solutions to typical
problems, without regard to the conceptual predispositions of various

legal systems.195 In keeping with this approach, courts and commentators should resist the temptation to interpret the Convention in light
of their own national laws. Although parts of the Convention will
look familiar to lawyers from every legal system, it would be wrong to
assume that some familiar aspect carries the same implications within
the Convention as it does in domestic law.196 The damage provisions
in articles 74 to 77 provide a good example. An American lawyer

looking at those provisions may assume that the remedial provisions of
the Convention are generally the same as those in the Uniform Com(1979); Lansing & Hauserman, A Comparison of the Uniform Commercial Code to UNCITRAL's
Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods, 6 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 63
(1980); Patterson, United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Good"
Unification and the Tension Between Compromise and Domination. 22 STAN. J. INV'L L. 263
(1986); Reczei, The Area of Operationof the InternationalSales Conventions 29 AM. J. CoMP. L.
513 (1981); Rosett, CriticalReflections on the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the
InternationalSale of Goods, 45 OHIo ST. L.J. 265 (1984); Comment, Contract Formation Under
the United Nations Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalSale of Goods and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 3 DicK. J. INT'L L. 107 (1984). Bibliographies of commentary in numerous
languages are available. See J. HONNOLD, supra note 4, at 29-34; Honnold, Bibliography:
Unification of Trade Law and UNCITRAL, 27 AM. J. CoMP. L. 212 (1979); Winship,
Bibliography: InternationalSale of Goods, 18 INT'L LAW. 53 (198).
194. The effort to promote international discussion of issues raised by the Convention and to
encourage uniform interpretation by courts and arbiters is proceeding in many places by many
people. Proposals have been made to have UNCITRAL collect and distribute reports of
decisions interpreting the Convention and perhaps to issue interpretative recommendations from
time to time. See Disseminationof Decisions Concerning UNCITRAL Legal Texts and Uniform
Interpretationof Such Texts: Note by the Secretariat,U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/267 (1985). Individual
scholars and international organizations are also addressing these issues and seeking ways to
promote international discussion and deliberation. See eg., Honnold, Methodology to Achieve
Uniformity in Applying InternationalAgreement, Examined in the Setting of the Uniform Law
for InternationalSales Under the 1980 U.N. Convention (Report to the Twelfth Congress of the
International Academy of Comparative Law, 1986) (summarizing and presenting reports of
scholars and government officials throughout the world).
195. See supra notes 9-17 and accompanying text.
196. See J. HONNOLD, supranote 4, § 88, at 114-15; P. SCHLECHTRIEM, supra note 39, at 37;
Kastely, Unification and Community: A Rhetorical Analysis of the United Nations Sales
Convention (forthcoming in 8 Nw. . INT'L L. & Bus. (1988)); cf Bonell, Some Critical
Reflections on the New UNCITRAL Draft Convention on InternationalSale, 1978 REVUE DE
DRoiT UNiFORME, pt. 2, at 2 (contrasting one view of the Convention as a limited law to be
supplemented by national law with that treating the Convention as an autonomous ius
commune).
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mercial Code or the older Uniform Sale of Goods Act. This assumption would be seriously mistaken, as Part I of this article
demonstrates.
Similarly, courts, lawyers, and commentators who are familiar with
the 1964 Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods 19 7 and the
Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts'9 8 should resist the
temptation to interpret provisions of the Convention in light of cases
decided under these Uniform Laws. The Uniform Laws were drafted
by the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT), through the work of a distinguished group of legal
scholars. Although the Uniform Laws represent many years of careful
work, they are oriented toward European legal systems and they have
been adopted primarily by the European countries.1 99
UNCITRAL began its work on the Sales Convention with a careful
examination of the Uniform Laws, including comments by the delegates on specific provisions.2 °° Thereafter, many of the provisions of
the Uniform Laws were used as starting points for the drafting of parts
of the Convention. This use of the Uniform Laws, however, should
not be understood to incorporate into the Sales Convention the
detailed law developed under the Uniform Laws. To the contrary, the
drafting history of the Sales Convention indicates a clear determina197. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964,
Annex (Uniform Law on the International Sale of Goods), 834 U.N.T.S. 109, 123.
198. Convention Relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, July 1, 1964, Annex I (Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods), 834 U.N.T.S. 171, 185.
199. The Uniform Law on International Sales (1964) was ratified and acceded to by only
eight nations: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Gambia, Israel, Italy, the
Netherlands, San Marino, and the United Kingdom, and the Uniform Law on Formation has
been ratified by seven of these, excluding Israel. Honnold, The Draft Convention on Contractsfor
the InternationalSale of Goods: An Overview, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 223, 224 n.7 (1979). Of the 28
nations that attended the 1964 Hague Conference, 22 were European. Id. at 225 n.12. See
ProgressiveDevelopment of the Law of International Trade: Report of the Secretary-General,21
U.N. GAOR Annex 3 (Agenda Item 88) para. 30, U.N. Doc. A/6396 (1966), reprintedin [1970]
1 Y.B.U.N. COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L. 18, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970. The European
orientation of the 1964 Uniform Laws was a major impetus for formation of UNCITRAL and
for the Sales Convention project. See Date-Bah, Problems of the Unification of International
Sales Law from the Standpoint of Developing Countries, in PROBLEMS OF UNIFICATION OF
INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW in 7 DIGEST OF COMMERCIAL LAWS OF THE WORLD 39, 43-44
(1980); Patterson, supra note 193, at 267-71; Reinhart, supra note 160, at 94; Comment, A New
Uniform Law for the InternationalSale of Goods: Is It Compatible with American Interests?, 2
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 129 (1980).
200. See Analysis of Replies and Comments by Governments on the Hague Conventions of
1964: Report by the Secretary-General,U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/31, reprinted in [1970] 1 Y.B.U.N.
COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE L. 159, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970; Report of the United
Nations Commission on InternationalTrade Law on the Work ofIts FirstSession, 23 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16) at 16-19, U.N. Doc. A/7216 (1968).

650

Requiring Performance in International Sales
tion on the part of UNCITRAL to develop a code with worldwide
application and to move beyond the European orientation of the Uniform Laws. The Sales Convention therefore should be interpreted as
an autonomous legal system, structured by the general principles upon
which it is based, and organized according to the issues and concerns
addressed in its drafting history. It would be a serious disservice to
the Convention to encumber it with the text and case law of the European-oriented Uniform Laws.
It is very important, then, that the Sales Convention be interpreted
according to its own terms, as a new and autonomous international
code. Courts and commentators should strive to develop an international jurisprudence of Convention interpretation which gives detailed
content to the notion of internationalism in transnational trade law.
This can be done by resisting the temptation to interpret the Convention in light of other laws, by paying careful attention to the detailed
text of the Convention, by striving to articulate the detailed meanings
of the general principles of the Convention, and by wide dissemination
and attention to the Convention's drafting history. The general principles of the Convention include those expressly stated in article 7 and
those implicitly embodied in other provisions of the Convention,
including the values of equal treatment and respect for the different
cultural, social, and legal backgrounds of international traders; contractual commitment; forthright communication between parties;
good faith and trust; and the forgiveness of human error.20 1
Issues relating to the remedial provisions of the Convention will no
doubt be the focus of a large part of the discussion and deliberation
surrounding application of the Convention. Courts, arbiters, lawyers,
traders, and scholars can significantly advance the goals of uniformity,
certainty, and equity in the law governing international trade by interpreting the Convention's remedial provisions with a sophisticated
understanding of their drafting history and their underlying rationale.
Pursuant to such an approach, article 28 in particular should be interpreted so as to preserve as much as possible a uniform right to performance as recognized in the Convention's general remedial
provisions.

201. See Kastely, supra note 196; cf J.

Ho NNOLD,

supra note 4, §§ 99-102, at 129-33.

